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Chapter 6 
Religion: Naturalized, Socialized, 
Evaluated 
Since there isn't any religion in nature, it may be difficult to natural-
ize it even harder than with ethics, where there is animal reciprocal 
cooperation as a precursor. Religion is without antecedents in wild 
nature. Still, the capacity in persons to be religious somehow 
evolved within, or emerged out of, natural systems, where before 
there was no such capacity. Religion too, like ethics and science, is 
eminent in the human genius. Human societies, historically, always 
produce religion. Again, there must be some story to tell – this time 
of the genesis of religion. Now too, however, one must assess such 
accounts of the genesis of religion as these are set alongside reli-
gious accounts of the genesis of nature and culture, analogously to 
the way one needs an account of the genesis, in culture, of science, 
set alongside science's account of such genesis of nature and cul-
ture. 
One should be wary. The question is of the logic as well as of the 
origin of religion. Religion today may be something quite different 
from what earlier religion and its precursors initially were. The 
monotheism widespread in the West, which has interacted with sci-
ence for several centuries, is quite different from aboriginal ani-
misms. The many religions may not have common origins or any 
common logic; their origins and operations may differ. Most of what 
the earliest humans thought is lost in the mists of the past; any psy- 
choprehistory is speculative. One would commit the genetic fallacy 
if one overlooked ways that religions have matured, reformed, and 
transformed over the millennia of cumulative and critical transmis-
sible cultures. Religions change, as much as does science. We know 
much more about what religion now is, and, failing knowledge of 
the routes traveled in the remote past, it could be a mistake to be so 
sure we know the determinants along the way. 
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Still, origins contribute to explanations in a deeply historical 
world. In evaluating religious accounts of origins, we will be wiser if 
we can discover how humans came to be religious, especially since 
religious capacities are a unique mark of Homo sapiens. Two ques-
tions are entwined: Is there a plausible religious account of genes 
and their genesis? Is there a plausible account of the genesis of reli-
gion, relating its origin to genes? Neither account will be by way of 
implication, whether deductive or inductive. There are no covering 
laws (such as natural selection) plus initial conditions (such as pri-
mates) from which one can infer religion (persons who are priests), 
any more than one can assume microbes as a premise and deduce 
primates in conclusion. Perhaps we cannot even predict what univer-
sal religions in advanced societies will be like, if we know what early 
religions in simple societies were. That development too may be 
more historical or culturally contingent than logically or biologically 
necessary. 
The best explanation available will be a "how-possibly" explana-
tion, not a "why-necessarily" explanation (Hempel 1965, p. 428); that 
is, it will trace a pathway along which religion might have appeared. 
It will also be true that there appears on Earth later on something, 
religion, of which there was exactly none before. Ideas may also ap-
pear within later religions that have little or no precedent in previous 
religions. Religious experience transforms animal experience of the 
environment. Experience of nature takes on a dimension of depth, 
the experience of the sacred. Nature becomes sacramental, as also do 
events in culture. This could be illusory mythology that is success-
fully functional. It could be an epiphenomenal anomaly, like dreams 
that have little to do with the real world. But it might be, like science 
and ethics, the achievement of new levels of insight. The fact that our 
perceptual and conceptual faculties have evolved does not mean that 
nothing true appears in them, nor that nothing new can ever appear 
in them. 
Although origins contribute to understanding, the genesis of reli-
gion, unique to humans, is unlikely to be something one can extrap-
olate from earlier explanations in biology. A good rule facing the 
future is to stick with explanations previously tested; the sun will 
rise tomorrow because it rose yesterday and yesteryear. One will be 
right almost all the time, for the future is regularly like the past. One 
will be wrong every time the event under consideration is an advent 
making a critical difference introducing what is genuinely novel. One 
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will miss every occasion of originating genesis. All one's explana-
tions will be anachronistic. In the continuing creation, the future is 
never like the past: life appeared where none was before, exoskele- 
tons and endoskeletons arose, photosynthesis evolved, so did sexu-
ality and warm blood. So did vertebrates, sentience, pain, hiding, 
smelling, alarm calls, courting of mates, aggressive displays, learned 
behavior. So did fire building, tool making, language, writing, 
money, internal combustion engines, computers, rockets. So did 
ethics, science. And religion. What are we to make of sacrifice, 
prayer, altars, sacraments, cultus, shamans, priests, prophets, saviors, 
preachers? 
It is tempting to dismiss novel appearances at first as "apparent" 
anomalies, because lawlike explanation dislikes counterexamples 
that defy the law. Some way is found by which these are "nothing 
but" appearances, and the old account, extrapolated, holds despite 
appearances. But when the appearances continue to mount, the law 
diminishes in its logical appeal. The developing appearances, the 
anomalies, are sometimes recompounded into history. When religion 
appears, can one subsume it under yesterday's explanatory catego-
ries? Or is this a deepening of the plot? 
1. THE DIVINE EPIC OF LIFE 
Religion is generated confronting nature – the sunset, the midnight 
sky, the wind and the rain, the forest primeval, birth and death, life 
renewed in the midst of its perpetual perishing. Though religion 
arises only within human societies and notably helps humans to 
manage within such societies, coupling neighbors and God, it will 
not suffice to get religion socialized (Sections 2, 3, and 4). One must 
also get religion naturalized, not so much in the sense of explaining 
it (away) naturalistically, as of explaining the numinous encounter 
with manifest nature. Biology does generate religion: the phenome-
non of life evokes a religious response whether or not a functional 
human society is at issue, whether or not one is being altruistic or 
evangelistic toward others. Nature is the first mystery to be encoun-
tered, and society comes later, much later, after one learns evolution-
ary history. Surveying paleontological history, Loren Eiseley ex-
claims, "Nature itself is one vast miracle transcending the reality of 
night and nothingness" (1960, p. 171). 
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Religion begins also in physics and chemistry, matter and energy; 
in cosmology. Why is there something rather than nothing? Why is 
there something of a kind that spins this surprising kind of uni-
verse? But the most startling results are on Earth, not in the heav-
ens. Our native-range life world stands about midway between the 
infinitesimal and the immense on the natural scale. The size of a 
planet is near the geometric mean of the size of the known universe 
and the size of the atom. The mass of a human being is the geomet-
ric mean of the mass of Earth and the mass of a proton. Astronomi-
cal nature and micronature, profound as they are, are nature in the 
simple. At both ends of the spectrum of size, nature lacks the com-
plexity that it demonstrates at the mesolevels, found in Earthen eco-
systems, or at psychological levels in human persons in their socie-
ties. Humans do not live at the range of the infinitely small, nor at 
that of the infinitely large, but we may well live at the range of the 
infinitely complex. 
There is in a typical handful of humus, which may have ten billion 
organisms in it, a richness of structure, a volume of information (tril-
lions of "bits"), resulting from evolutionary processes across a billion 
years of history, greatly advanced over anything in myriad galaxies, 
or even, so far as we know, in all of them. The human being is the 
most sophisticated of known natural products. In our hundred and 
fifty pounds of protoplasm, in our three pounds of brain, there may 
be more operational organization than in the whole of the Androm-
eda galaxy. The number of possible associations among the trillion 
neurons of a human brain, where each cell can "talk" to as many as 
a thousand other cells, may exceed the number of atoms in the uni-
verse. On a gross cosmic scale, Earth is insignificant and humans are 
minuscule atoms. But on scales of prolific genesis, Earth is quite sig-
nificant, and mind is a most impressive creation. The brain is so cu-
riously a microcosm of this macrocosm, since the mind can contain 
so much of nature within thought and thus mirror the world. We 
might live at the center of the most genesis. 
As far as we can gain it, we, who have such minds, need a unified 
account, one that narrates the whole Earth story and locates our-
selves in it. Call such worldviews "myths" if you wish; they must 
now be couched in scientific mythology; afterward one can see 
whether such accounts of the genesis that has taken place here re-
main congenial to any of the classical religious myths. 
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(1) The Prolific Earth 
One thing is right about the fertility hypothesis as the key to under-
standing life: humans reside on a fertile Earth. Evolutionary history 
has been fruitful, prolific. This is no myth; it is among the best estab-
lished facts. But what hypothesis best explains this fact? From the 
dawn of religious impulses, in the only animal capable of such reflec-
tion, this vitality has been experienced as sacred. Such experience 
has been often fragmentary and confused, as has every other form of 
knowledge that humans have struggled to gain, but at its core this 
insight developed that religion was about an abundant life, about life 
in its abundance. Classical monotheism developed (evolved) into a 
fertile (widely reproducing) hypothesis that claims – to take the He-
brew form of it – that the divine Spirit, Wind (Greek: pneuma), 
breathes the breath of life into the dust of the Earth and animates it 
to generate swarms of living beings (Genesis 2.7). Eastern forms can 
be significantly different – maya spun over Brahman, or samsara over 
sunyata – but they too detect the sacred in, with, and under the pro-
fuse phenomena. 
In that sense, the fact that religious conviction cherishes, con-
serves, and celebrates this fertility is no reason to think religion sus-
pect; to the contrary, it is reason to think it profound. If this be 
animal faith, we still need to ask whether the animal in which such 
faith emerges, Homo sapiens, is coping now because it is detecting the 
truth: there is a divine will for life to continue. Genes and their gen-
esis do lie behind the genesis of religion – but not (we will be claim-
ing) in the way typically alleged by behavioral psychologists and 
sociobiologists. Rather, the genesis in natural history, when humans 
discover and reflect over this, generates religious responses. "Fertil-
ity" is precisely what evokes religious belief. The prolific Earthen 
"fertility," "fecundity," or generative capacity is what most needs to 
be explained in the spectacular display of life in which we find our-
selves immersed. 
"Fertility" is literally used of the fauna and flora, though perhaps we 
are metaphorically extending it to evolutionary ecosystems and the 
global biosphere. "Nature" (we recall) has, as root idea, "giving birth." 
If we must use metaphors, after Darwin, the Earth is as much like a 
womb in these gestating powers as it is, after Newton, a clockwork ma- 
chine, or, after Einstein, energy and matter bubbling up out of a space- 
time matrix. The genesis is widely distributed over the planetary 
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space and long continuing over evolutionary time, evidenced by the 
biodiversity so well documented in the biological sciences. 
This genesis is hard fact. No one doubts that these myriad species, 
including Homo sapiens, are here. No one doubts that there lies be-
hind us some sort of genesis, and few readers of this book doubt that 
evolutionary natural history is a key to this genesis.   But a self- 
generating nature is not self-explanatory. One needs an account of 
the setup, an account of the generating processes; of how possibilities 
get actualized, of how possibility spaces come to be; of the depth 
sources of the creativity. In this genesis, "more" regularly comes 
from "less." Something comes, if not from nothing, at least where 
nothing like that was present before. Information does appear, su-
perimposed on matter and energy, a key to the vital generation of 
life. This is a pregnant Earth. But we know what pregnant means 
with females giving birth, the vital information transferred in DNA 
from one generation to the next, and we must puzzle over where and 
how such information originates on Earth (Section 5[2]). 
Such hard fact is hard to explain without some sort of generative 
principles before which many persons are inclined, one way or an-
other, to become religious. Ernst Mayr, one of the most eminent liv-
ing biologists, concludes, "Virtually all biologists are religious, in the 
deeper sense of the word, even though it may be a religion without 
revelation. . . . The unknown and maybe unknowable instills in us a 
sense of humility and awe" (1982, p. 81). We detect something sub-
lime in the awe-inspiring sense because there is something sublime 
in the etymological sense of that word, something that takes us to 
the limits of our understanding, and mysteriously beyond. 
Viewing Earthrise from the moon, the astronaut Edgar Mitchell 
was entranced: 
Suddenly from behind the rim of the moon, in long, slow-motion 
moments of immense majesty, there emerges a sparkling blue 
and white jewel, a light, delicate sky-blue sphere laced with 
slowly swirling veils of white, rising gradually like a small pearl 
in a duck sea of black mystery. It takes more than a moment to 
fully realize this is Earth. . . home. (Kelley 1988, at photographs 
42-45) 
The astronaut Michael Collins recalled being Earth-struck: 
The more we see of other planets, the better this one looks. When 
I traveled to the Moon, it wasn't my proximity to that battered 
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rockpile I remember so vividly, but rather what I saw when I 
looked back at my fragile home – a glistening, inviting beacon, 
delicate blue and white, a tiny outpost suspended in the black 
infinity. Earth is to be treasured and nurtured, something pre-
cious that must endure. (1980, p. 6) 
Ernst Mayr's thoughtful biologist not only has religious humility, but 
a respect for nature. "And if one is a truly thinking biologist, one has 
a feeling of responsibility for nature, as reflected by much of the 
conservation movement" (1985b, p. 60). 
The Earth is a pearl in a sea of black mystery. That is metaphor, 
but metaphor witnessing to the eventful genesis on Earth and wit-
nessing to the power of such genesis, when scientifically known, to 
generate convictions of value present, to generate religious wonder. 
Whatever may be said of the rest of the universe, Earth is a prolific 
place, a pro-life place. That is the testimony of science, as well as a 
religious conviction. To use a weighted term, the telos, ending, head-
ing, of the Earth process is "fertility," generativity, as evidenced in 
the telos (lives defended as ends-in-themselves) of the organisms that 
are its myriad products. Say if you like that there is a bias for self- 
organizing or autopoiesis in the process (Kauffman 1993; 1995; Ma- 
turana and Varela 1980) that explains the remarkable results. That 
may be good science, but now we are in a religious or metaphysical 
mode and need to explain this remarkable bias. Nature has been 
generously fertile. 
(2) Nature and Spirit (Geist) 
The story is nowhere more fantastic than in the evolution of spirit 
within and out of nature. Molecules, trillions of them, spin round in 
complicated ways and generate the unified, focused experience of 
mind. This too is among the established facts. For this appearance of 
"genius" (Latin: spirit) scientists can, as yet, hardly imagine a theory, 
though if ever such a theory appears, we shall welcome it as the 
most ingenious theory of all. Meanwhile, putting together molecular 
parts does not really explain how inwardness comes out of outward-
ness, how felt experience arises where before there was none. 
At this point scientists, no less than religious persons, believe what 
they do not understand: that the output exceeds the input, that the 
results outrun the causes, that there evolves, incrementally and yet 
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ex nihilo too, something in kind (subjects) where, if one looks rear-
ward far enough, nothing of that kind existed before among the 
Earth objects. The human Geist is especially fertile in its generation 
of cumulative transmissible cultures, something novel in kind again, 
now in only one species, for, if one looks rearward in any of the 
other several billion species over evolutionary time, there is nothing 
of this kind. Persons too are among the established facts with which 
we must deal. There is personal narrative as an ego travels through 
the world. 
The real surprise is that the human intelligence can be religious 
and philosophical; we nowhere approach that elsewhere in animal 
life. That is why it is so hard to get religion naturalized; it is quite 
unprecedented. Human spirits have Existenz. They anticipate death; 
they sense their finitude. They face the limit questions, sense the 
sacred, worry about communion with the ultimate or atonement of 
their sins. They know guilt, forgiveness, shame, remorse, glory, 
pride. They suffer angst and alienation. They build symbols with 
which they interpret their place and role in their world. They create 
ideologies, affirm creeds, and debate them. They are capable of faith 
and need salvation. They worship God. All of this is summed up in 
the one word: "spirit" (Geist). 
Out of physical premises one derives biological conclusions, and, 
taking these as premises in turn, one derives psychological conclu-
sions, which, recompounded again, yield spiritual conclusions. This 
kind of logic seems more story than argument; the form of argument 
is not so much rational as, to use a religious word, incarnational, 
since each step has to be embodied. Story is a better category than 
unfolding law, much less random drift, or selfish defense of life, 
when one wants to get more out of less. If one tries to interpret the 
world as law plus initial conditions, there is little plot. If one tries to 
interpret the world as statistical probabilities, there is little story. But 
when we tell the story of suffering through to something higher, over 
the millennia of microbes, and trilobites, dinosaurs and primates, 
persons who are scientists and saints, we have enough bite for a 
dramatic story. 
(3) Nature and Sin 
Humans forge their cultural history beyond biology, but this is not 
particularly to praise humans and belittle beasts. Part of the human 
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genius is the genesis of sin. Humans have a superiority of opportu-
nity, capacities unattained in animal life. Alas, however, the human 
capacity is but brokenly attained. Much of the history that humans 
have made is checkered enough. There are noble achievements, but 
humans repeatedly stand condemned because they could and ought 
to have made for themselves better history than they did. Religion 
has tried to face this fact full on, cognitively, existentially, and re- 
demptively. All classical religions find the human condition to be 
deeply flawed; humans need salvation. "Our civilizations were jer- 
rybuilt around the [human] biogram," Wilson laments (1975a, 
p. 548). But to discover that the world is in a troubled condition is no 
new revelation to religious sages; to the contrary, it is what they have 
regularly taught. In Judeo-Christian monotheism, the central cate-
gory is that of "sin," missing the mark; in Eastern faiths the category 
is that of "ignorance,' avidya. Islam uses both evaluations. 
There is something "original" about sin, something in human ori-
gins that produces sin perennially, something in human biology, in 
the flesh, that makes it inevitable for humans to lapse into sin. At 
this point biology and theology are well within dialogue; indeed they 
can seem to be saying almost the same thing. The innate biological 
"selfishness" concurs with what classical religions have been teach-
ing for millennia. But this congruence of biology and religion will 
have to be interpreted with some care. 
Humans do have to break out of their animal nature. When ani-
mals act "like beasts," as nonmoral beings, nothing is amiss. To the 
contrary, spectacular values have been achieved over the evolution-
ary millennia. But if humans go no further, something is amiss; in-
deed, in theological terms, something is ungodly. They "fall" into 
evil, rather than rise to their destiny. This is not because their ani-
mal nature is selfish; the word "selfish" does not apply where there 
are no moral agents. Rather, trying to become human without emer-
gence from the animal nature results in selfishness. That stagnates 
in animal nature. "The natural man [who] does not receive the gifts 
of the Spirit of God" (1 Corinthians 2.14) is not so much "fallen," as 
nonrisen, failing rather than falling, languishing in animal nature 
and falling away from his humane, godly ideal. That is the story 
parable of Genesis 1-3, a story that is both once upon a time, and 
once upon all times, aboriginal and perennial, the situation into 
which humans are now born, which also discloses the ancient past. 
That is the prologue, sketched mythically, and profoundly orienting 
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the whole story of salvation to follow. What was and is in the ani-
mals a good thing becomes ("falls into") a bad thing when it is the 
only thing in human life. This arrests advancement to the next, the 
human, humane stage. 
Is our genetic inheritance the source of the problem? Genetic pro-
cesses conserve value, but they are, or ought to be, here surpassed. 
The impulses that give rise to sin (such as those for self-defense) are 
inherited, though they are not, biologically speaking, a defect in 
nonhuman lives, or even in human lives, unless and until the op-
tions for higher defenses of value arrive, behavioral possibilities, 
freedoms, from which humans do defect. Human cultural inheri-
tance requires experiences super-to-the-genetic, super-to-the-natural, 
that is, beyond the previous attainment and power of biology. 
Those experiences come creatively, with struggle, with an arduous 
passage through a twilight zone of spirit in exodus from nature. 
This does not mean that nature is bad; nature is pronounced to be 
very good – not perfect, because culture is yet to come – but intrin-
sically good. Humans are made godward, to turn toward God, but 
shrink back and act like beasts. Genesis is the story not of the fall 
from perfection, but of the "fall" of the aboriginal couple from inno-
cence into sin and of their awakening into this state. After the sin, 
"the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were na-
ked" (Genesis 3.7). 
The aboriginal couple, symbols of us all, rise out of innocence into 
the world of moral choice, which brings growth into responsibility, 
imaging God, but also, inevitably, falling into sin, as shown in Cain's 
killing of Abel and in the subsequent Genesis stories of the worsen-
ing human condition. Killing is not new in the world; primates have 
killed each other for millennia in the defense of their genetic lines. 
But murder is new in the world; the human has risen to an option to 
do otherwise and therefore ought to do otherwise. The murderer 
fails, falls back; his opportunity for humanity is now broken, and his 
society falls under a curse. The Earth cries out for justice. Society 
becomes a confused chaos, a babel. 
Self-actualizing is a good thing for humans as well as animals. 
Self-interest is godly; the commandment, we remember, is to love 
others as we do ourselves. The garden is full of trees to eat; we pray 
for our daily bread. But concupiscence, the desire to possess and 
enjoy inordinately, is not a fitting form of life in the world. Natural 
selection does favor the "self-serving" individual, and there is no 
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reason to deplore this process. The fauna and flora are checked in 
this possessive impulse by the limitations of their ecosystems – 
which provide a satisfactory place, a niche, for each specific form of 
life, but limit each species to its appropriate sector, where it has 
adapted fit. The human species is not so checked, but tempted by the 
fearful power of hand and mind to possess the whole. The human 
species has no natural niche, no limits by natural selection, that is 
relaxed progressively as the human species rises to culture as its 
niche, superposed on nature. 
What religion warns, past the ethical aspirations (of Chapter 5), 
past the scientific aspirations (in Chapter 4), in critique of culture 
(Chapter 3), is that ethics and science, like all cultural activities, reli-
gion included, will be warped by human ambiguity, by the evil that 
besets their loftiest aspirations toward the good. Both morality and 
rationality, unredeemed from self-love, will prove dysfunctional and 
tragic. Both science and ethics need to be redeemed. Here the value 
crisis is taken to a new level. Symbolically put, those who wish them-
selves to be God fail tragically; those who wish to image God can 
become children of God, though made of the dust of Earth. The 
dusty beast reaches to be god; that is biology gone amok, the original 
sin. 
In the Buddhist version of this story, our inordinate thirsts (tanha) 
make the world unsatisfactory (dukkha), and humans can be released 
only by enlightenment that transcends the self (anatta). In the Hindu 
version, human ignorance (avidya) mistakes the empirical self (jiva) 
for the true self (atman) and misses the universal (Brahman). There 
are important differences with the Hebrew-Christian vision, beyond 
our scope here. Meanwhile, each in its own way inhibits the geneti-
cally transmitted animal drives so that the cultural transmission 
checks and humanizes the genetic one. Genes may make one selfish, 
but it is not genes that make one Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, or 
religiously Jewish; rather, one converts to teachings that discipline 
and inhibit these genetically based drives. 
Nature produces matter and energy, then objective life, then sub-
jective life, then mind and culture. The fourth movement is mostly in 
a minor key – and beautiful for its conflict and resolution, for the 
struggling through to something higher. The evolutionary epic, 




(4) Suffering and Creation 
The story is of the evolution of suffering; this too is among the emer- 
gents. In chemistry, physics, astronomy, geomorphology, meteorol-
ogy, nothing suffers; in botany life is stressed, but only in zoology 
does pain emerge. Genes do not suffer; organisms with genes need 
not suffer, but those with neurons do. One is not much troubled by 
seeds that fail, but it is difficult to avoid pity for nestling birds fallen 
to the ground. In every season, most of the sentient young starve; are 
eaten, abused, abandoned. Life is indisputably prolific; it is just as 
indisputably pathetic (Greek: pathos), almost as if its logic were pa-
thos. The fertility is close-coupled with the struggle. 
There is no moral agency in nature, no immoral selfishness; that 
was a category mistake. There are both intrinsic and shared values. 
Also, without doubt, there is suffering; there is no more certain fact 
than this disvalue. One is not going to get religion naturalized, or 
socialized, until one reckons with this. Dukkha, that the world is suf-
fering, is the first noble truth of Buddhism. Genesis 1-2 begins with 
a good world, but by Genesis 3 it has fallen, and redemptive suffer-
ing is the critical theme of both faiths. 
Suffering is a troubling fact, but the first fact to notice is that suf-
fering is the shadow side of sentience, felt experience, consciousness, 
pleasure, intention, all the excitement of subjectivity waking up so 
inexplicably from mere objectivity. Rocks do not suffer, but the stuff 
of rocks has organized itself into animals who experience pains and 
pleasures, into humans whose Existenz includes anxiety and afflic-
tion. We may wonder why we suffer, but it is also quite a wonder 
that we are able to suffer. Something stirs in the cold, mathematical 
beauty of physics, in the heated energies supplied by matter, and 
there is first an assembling of living objects, and still later of suffering 
subjects. Energy turns into pain. The world begins with causes, mere 
causes; it rises to generate concern and care. Is this now ugliness 
emergent for the first time? Or a valuable good, sentient life, with its 
inevitable dark side? Suffering too involves the historical genesis of 
something in kind where nothing of that kind existed before. 
Pain is objectively present in nature, and what is its connection 
with genesis? Struggle is the dark side of creativity, logically and 
empirically the shadow side of pleasure. One cannot enjoy a world 
in which one cannot suffer, any more than one can succeed in a 
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world in which one cannot fail. The logic here is not so much formal 
or universal as it is dialectical and narrative. In natural history, the 
pathway to psychosomatic consciousness, the only kind of experi-
ence we know, is through flesh that can feel its way through that 
world. An organism can have needs, which is not possible in inert 
physical nature. If the environment can be a good to it, that brings 
also the possibility of deprivation as a harm. To be alive is to have 
problems. Things can go wrong just because they can also go right. 
Sentience brings the capacity to move about deliberately in the 
world, and also to get hurt by it. There might have evolved sense 
organs without any capacity to be pained by them. But sentience is 
not invented to permit mere observation of the world, rather to 
awaken some concern for protection of the kinesthetic core of an 
experiential life that can suffer. A neural animal can love something 
in its world and is free to seek this, a capacity greatly advanced over 
anything known in immobile, insentient plants. The appearance of 
sentience is the appearance of caring, when the organism is united 
with or torn from its loves. The story is not merely of goings on, but 
of going concerns, that is, of values that matter. 
Pain is eminently useful in survival, and it will be naturally se-
lected, on average, as functional pain. Natural selection requires pain 
as much as pleasure in its construction of concern and caring; pain is 
an alarm system in a world where there are helps and hurts through 
which a sentient organism must move. On the other hand, any pop-
ulation whose members are constantly in counterproductive pain 
will be selected against and go extinct or develop some capacities to 
minimize it. In this sense, natural selection, so far from needlessly 
increasing pain, rather trims it back in the system, so far as the sys-
tem can remain vital, conservationist, and developmental. Pain is 
self-eliminating except insofar as it is instrumental of a subsequent, 
functional good. Intrinsic pain has no logical or empirical place in 
the system; neither does maladaptive pain. 
The capacity to suffer is generally accompanied by possibilities of 
avoiding suffering, some freedom and self-assertion. The capacity to 
suffer, for instance, drives the capacity for learned behavior; it brings 
animal life to a central focus in sentient consciousness, as cannot 
happen in plants. Thought appears in order to prevent pain and to 
affirm well-being, but the thinker that cannot feel pain cannot figure 
out how to escape it. In humans, this evolution of thought seeking 
comfort drives the transition from nature to culture. 
304 
Religion 
We cannot show this in the detail of every case; perhaps we need 
not expect it to be true in every case, and there are troublesome 
anomalies. Nevertheless, the system statistically must select for ben-
eficial pain. The system historically uses pain for creative advance. 
Such is the biology of life. Theologically speaking, this position is not 
inconsistent with a theistic belief about God's providence; rather, it 
is in many respects remarkably like it. There is grace sufficient to 
cope with thorns in the flesh (2 Corinthians 12.7-9). Life is a table 
prepared in the midst of enemies, green pastures in the valley of 
deep darkness (Psalm 23). 
The vast number of creatures sprouted, hatched, or born are, of 
necessity, more or less well-endowed genetically and emplaced in a 
more or less congenial environment, despite or including the fact that 
in their environment they are spurred to earn they way. Even though 
most will not live to maturity, they are competently programmed for 
their tasks. Organisms survive in about that proportion in which 
they are viable, so that life is sustained in any individual in relative 
proportion to its fitness for it. The community of life is continually 
regenerated, as well as creatively advanced, and this requires value 
capture as nutrients, energy, and skills are shuttled round the trophic 
pyramids. From a systemic point of view, this is the conversion of a 
resource from one life stream to another – the anastomosing of life 
threads that characterizes an ecosystem. The "waste" (as it first ap-
pears) is really the systematic interconversion of life materials; nature 
recycles. Death in vivo is death ultimately; death in communitatis is 
death penultimately but life regenerated over the millennia of species 
lines and dynamic biotic communities, millennia continuing almost 
forever. 
Individual organisms must die. Species do not have to die; most, 
of course, do die. Ninety-eight percent of all species that have ever 
existed did go extinct, so there are high probabilities, but there is no 
law of nature or inevitability about species extinction. But here a 
puzzling aspect of the matter strikes us. By virtue of the smart genes, 
the death of the organism feeds into the nondeath of the species. 
Only by replacements can the species track the changing environ-
ment; only by replacements can they evolve into something else. 
Genera and species sometimes do die, that is, go extinct without 
issue, but they are often transformed into something else, new genera 
and species, and, on average, there have been more arrivals than 
extinctions – the increase of both diversity and complexity over evo- 
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lutionary history. The loss of species in natural systems has meant 
more birth than death; perhaps there too it is tragic, but it is not 
unredeemed tragedy. The "birthing" metaphor is at the root of the 
concept of "nature"; here creativity comes only with "labor" and 
"travail." 
Genes do not suffer but they do code this story of coping with 
suffering. They make the story possible, necessary for it, but they are 
not sufficient to interpret it. The world is not a paradise of hedonistic 
ease, but a theater where life is learned and earned by labor; in this 
struggle there is something demanding appropriate respect, some-
thing inviting reverence, something divine about the power to suffer 
through. The cruciform creation is, in the end, deiform, godly, just 
because of this element of struggle, not in spite of it. Among availa-
ble theories, there is no coherent alternative model by which, in a 
painless world, there might have come to pass anything like these 
dramas of nature and history that have happened, events that in their 
central thrusts we greatly value. 
Environmental necessity is the mother of cultural invention. An 
environment that was entirely hostile would slay us; neither life nor 
culture could ever appear there. A nature that was entirely irenic 
would stagnate us; human life could never have appeared there ei-
ther. All human culture, in which our classical humanity consists, 
originated in the face of oppositional nature. Nature insists that hu-
mans work, and this laboring and even suffering is its fundamental 
power for genesis. Creativity is through conflict and resolution. We 
suffer, and lest we suffer more, we organize ourselves creatively. In 
that sense, humans owe all culture to the hostility of nature, pro-
vided we can keep in tension with this the support of nature that is 
truer still, the one the warp, the other the woof, in the weaving of 
what we have become. 
Early and provident fear moves half the world. Suffering, far more 
than theory, principle, or faith, moves us to action. One should not 
posit the half-truth for the whole; we are drawn by affections quite 
as much as pushed by fears. These work in tandem reinforcement; 
one passes over into the other and is often its obverse. In this sense, 
pain is a prolife force. In the evolution of caring, the organism is 
quickened to its needs. 
Nor in humans is there only physical pain. Spirits know affliction. 
In humans the relationship between bodily wounding or deprivation 
and pain is quite complex, involving cognitive factors such as cul- 
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tural conditioning and psychological evaluation of the situation. Sin 
appears, as do guilt, insult, humiliation, reproach, grief, angst, alien-
ation, remorse. This is why such things as rape and slavery have 
meanings in culture that simply do not transfer to bluebirds or ants. 
One becomes reflectively self-conscious about the values of which 
one is deprived, sometimes by nature but now even more by the 
exploitations of culture. One knows one's social status, not just one's 
physical or biological state, and the former may determine behavior 
more than the latter. The concept one has of oneself, the gap between 
one's perceived real and ideal, and the placing of responsibility for 
closing of that gap, become critical. 
All this drives the religious life. In human spirits, the distinctive 
characteristics of spirit make tragedy and redemption possible. Birth 
is superseded by rebirth; the question of generation by the question 
of regeneration. Any adequate interpretation of this story of spirits 
fallen into tragedy and redeemed from this fall is going to be irre- 
ducibly religious. That is the essential theme of Christianity and Ju-
daism, for example, that suffering love is divine – and we doubt 
whether there is any competence in biology to evaluate whether this 
is true or false, although biology has competence enough to docu-
ment the struggle for survival, the sequence of life, death, and life 
renewed. Zoology, perhaps joined with psychology, can raise the 
problem of suffering, but its redemption is a religious issue. 
The way of history too, like that of nature, only more so, is a via 
dolorosa. Since the beginning, the myriad creatures have been giving 
up their lives as a ransom for many. In that sense, Jesus is not the 
exception to the natural order, but a chief exemplification of it. The 
secret of life is seen now to lie not so much in the heredity molecules, 
not so much in natural selection and the survival of the fittest, not so 
much in life's informational, cybernetic learning. The secret of life is 
that it is a passion play. This is the labor of divinity, misperceived if 
only seen as selfish genes. 
In this evaluation, we have not painted the world as better than it 
is in the interests of a philosophical metaphysics, nor worse either; 
rather we have tried to see into the depths of what is taking place in 
natural history. The view here is not panglossian; it is a tragic view 
of life, but one in which tragedy is the shadow of prolific creativity. 
That is the case, and the biological sciences with their evolutionary 
history can be brought to support this view, although neither tragedy 
nor creativity is part of their ordinary vocabulary. 
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2. RELIGION AND FERTILITY 
Religion, we have been claiming, is a response to the prolific Earth. 
There is an alternate account of the connection between religion and 
fertility. There is no religious behavior in nature, just as there is no 
moral behavior among the animals and plants. But humans behave 
religiously in culture, almost invariably so in classical cultures, and 
extensively still in modern cultures. Why so? For those wishing to 
explain, within the framework of biology, the genesis of religion in 
its connections with the genes, the evident way is to apply natural 
selection. Persons who are religious leave more offspring than those 
who are not. Persons who practice religion x leave more offspring 
than those who practice religion y. Religion a produced better adap-
tive fit in hunter-gatherer cultures; religion b produces better adap-
tive fit in agricultural cultures; religion c, in technological cultures. 
These begin to sound like claims that could be formulated in a statis-
tical, mathematical model. Birth rates are measurable, though if one 
is to correlate them with religions one will need also to put numbers 
on the degrees and kinds of religious belief. 
Such a religion-producing-offspring model might have been the 
way in which religion originated, or classically functioned, but no 
longer the way religions operate. In either case, the past numbers 
will now be hard to obtain. But this might also be elemental in all 
religion, and therefore the way religions operate today, in which case 
the theory might be more testable. Religious behavior in culture in 
any specific form is acquired, not innate, but there seems some ge-
netic tendency to acquire some religion or other. The novelty is reli-
gious behavior, previously absent from all other fauna and flora, but, 
when religion emerges in humans, the fundamental biological rules 
still apply. The fittest – in this case, the religious – survive. 
Wilson recognizes that religion is a critical test case: 
Religion constitutes the greatest challenge to human sociobiology 
and its most exciting opportunity to progress as a truly original 
theoretical discipline. . . . Religion is one of the major categories 
of behavior undeniably unique to the human species. The prin-
ciples of behavioral evolution drawn from existing population 
biology and experimental studies on lower animals are unlikely 
to apply in any direct fashion to religion. (1978, p. 175) 
There are reasons to believe that the deeper operations of religion 
will be concealed from its practitioners. Nevertheless: 
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When the gods are served, the Darwinian fitness of the tribe is 
the ultimate if unrecognized beneficiary. . . . The highest forms of 
religious practice, when examined more closely, can be seen to 
confer biological advantage. Above all they congeal identity. In 
the midst of the chaotic and potentially disorienting experiences 
each person undergoes daily, religion classifies him, provides 
him with unquestioned membership in a group claiming great 
powers, and by this means gives him a driving purpose in life 
compatible with his self-interest. (1978, pp. 184 and 188) 
It is certainly true that fertility is a fundamental theme in primitive 
religions. Practitioners seek the fertility of fields and flocks. They 
worship the sun and its warmth, they pray for rain in drought, they 
dance to help the maize grow. They seek fertility in childbirth. They 
seek cures from diseases for themselves and their children. The ety-
mological root of "salvation" (Latin: solus) is "health." "Elementary 
religions seek the supernatural for the purely mundane rewards of 
long life, abundant land and food, the avoidance of physical catastro-
phes, and defeat of enemies" (Wilson 1975a, p. 561). 
Religious rituals and ethics get people to cooperate for their mu-
tual good. Since people have to eat daily, reproduce each generation, 
and care for children throughout much of their adult lives, it is un-
surprising that fertility – success in staying alive from one generation 
to the next – is pervasive in religions that have succeeded. Any reli-
gion persisting over the centuries will, necessarily, result in repro-
ductive success. We know that before we look. 
Such elemental fertility is there right at the origin of Hebrew 
monotheism. Yahweh's divine promise to Abraham, frustrated be-
cause he was childless, was "I will make of you a great nation" 
(Genesis 12.2). Abraham did not even have one child yet, and God 
promised to make of him a nation; that's real reproductive success! 
The Abrahamic covenant is sealed by circumcision, a genital sacra-
ment if ever there was one! Moses at Sinai renewed this covenant 
and God commanded children, "Honor your father and your 
mother, that your days may be long in the land which the Lord your 
God gives you" (Exodus 20.12). God gave the Israelites a promised 
land, flowing with milk and honey. 
Boldly stated, all religions are fertility religions. "The biology of 
religion," according to Vernon Reynolds and Ralph Tanner, "looks 
at religions in terms of their contributions to individual (and, though 
to a lesser extent, group) survival and reproductive fitness" (1983, 
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p. 267; 1995, pp. 38-40; Reynolds 1991). This is the analogue of the 
previous claims that science and ethics are to be understood, at deep-
est level, in terms of the fertility they produce. The general theory of 
religion and its practices is that "these rules and the actions resulting 
from them are adaptive in the sense that they are found in countries 
where the results they produce will tend to enhance the reproductive 
success of individuals following them. Religions thus act as cultur-
ally phrased biological messages" (1983, p. 294; 1995, p. 40). 
This faith-fertility correlation can be cast into testable form and 
verified, so Reynolds and Tanner claim. They grade religions com-
paratively according to the impetus they give to reproductive activ-
ity. The result is a spectrum (Fig. 6.1) on which the maximally "pro- 
natalist" religion is Islam and the least reproductive is Protestant 
Christianity (1983, p. 289; Reynolds 1991). 
Some general positive correlation between religion and fertility 
sounds plausible. We cannot simply consider birth rates, of course, 
but must see how many children survive to reproductive age, and so 
general health and diet are critical. We need to know how religions 
contribute to sanitation, to parent-offspring and family caring and 
sharing, to solving of conflicts, to work initiative, what attitudes they 
have toward material necessities, which religions best stabilize soci-
eties and families sufficiently for the decades of child rearing, and so 








Figure 6.1. Religions and reproductivity (following Reynolds and Tanner 
1995; 1983, p. 289). 
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primary set of 'reproductive rules', a kind of 'parental investment 
handbook'" (1995, p. 40; 1983, p. 294). 
Different religions produce different sorts of comprehensive fit-
ness appropriate to local circumstances. In some environments (typ-
ically the uncertain ones, with high mortality rates), it is advanta-
geous to have many children, though each child has reduced 
survival likelihood, but in others (the more stable ones) it is advan-
tageous to have few children with high survival probability. So it 
turns out that the pronatalist Muslims may not have the edge over 
the Protestant Christians after all, if the latter have lots of Yankee 
ingenuity or high medical, agricultural, and industrial technology 
and a Puritan work ethic or a stable democratic society. 
There is a well-known model in ecology that describes differing 
reproductive strategies. On one end of a spectrum there are species 
with a reproductive strategy of numerous offspring in disturbed en-
vironments (r-selected species), and on the other are species produc-
ing fewer offspring in stable climax ecosystems (k-selected). The 
model needs to be adapted for humans; Reynolds and Tanner pro-
pose an analogous cultural variant rc+ (high birth rate) model versus a 
rc– (low birth rate) model (1983, pp. 11-17, and 269-270; 1995, p. 
39; Reynolds 1991, p. 209). Protestants do not need to breed much; 
they are rc– selected, not rc+ selected. 
Since it is difficult to compute quantitative judgments on all this, 
Reynolds and Tanner think that they can simplify the problem and 
get a fair estimate by looking at per capita energy consumption and 
gross national products, which are indicators of how prosperous a 
stable society has become (1983, pp. 290-295). Here the White Anglo- 
Saxon Protestants (WASPs) outconsume the poor Muslims and Hin-
dus. That high consumption and production explains how the 
WASPs get their fewer children more often to reproductive age. At 
the same time the higher birth rates in the pronatalist religions, dom-
inant in the lesser developed countries, explain the persistence of 
Islam and Hinduism. So now it turns out that all the religions on the 
spectrum, despite differentials in birth rates, have enough overall 
reproductive success to remain viable in their respective niches on 
the world scene. 
Such an investigation may seem to have proved the religion/fer-
tility thesis, but it may just as well be that it has assumed it. The only 
religions calibrated on the spectrum were religions that we knew 
before we started had supported substantial populations over gen- 
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erations. All that has been asked is whether differing religions, all 
successful, might succeed by varying their emphasis on number of 
children born relative to subsequent parental investment, depending 
on circumstances. Put that way, however, it seems entirely possible 
that one or more of these religions may, in different circumstances, 
allow differing reactions. Protestant Christians, for instance, in earlier 
centuries had higher birth rates. In 1800 in New England, when the 
birth rate was 7, compared to 2.1 in 1990, was the environment more 
or less stressful or stable than it is now? It is hard to say. 
Christianity, over the centuries and around the globe, has per-
sisted in remarkably diverse circumstances, as often nondemocratic 
as democratic, as often nontechnological as technological, as often in 
unstable as in stable environments, as also has Judaism. Buddhism 
has persisted in quite diverse environments, from ancient India to 
modern Japan. Reynolds claims that Christians, who are less prona- 
talist, do better in Europe because this is a less stressful environment 
than the Middle East, where the quite pronatalist Muslims flourish 
(1991, pp. 210-214). But Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, religions 
at both ends and the middle of the spectrum, all originated in the 
same place, the Middle East, where their originators presumably had 
about the same stressful or stable environments with which to cope. 
And all three spread widely. By this time we are beginning to lose 
any meaningful correlation between religion a and its rc+ selected 
strategy or religion b and its rc– selected strategy. All we are really 
left with is what we knew before inquiry, that the major world relig-
ions can encourage various behaviors enabling people to survive 
over generations in differing kinds of environments. 
Wilson seems to think it embarrassing that seeking the "supernat-
ural" brings "mundane" rewards, but this comes as no surprise to 
Jews or Christians. Moses urged, "You shall walk in all the ways 
which the Lord your God has commanded you, that you may live, 
and that it may go well with you, and that you may live long in the 
land which you shall possess. . . . And the Lord commanded us to do 
all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God, for our good always, that 
he might preserve us alive, as at this day" (Deuteronomy 5.33; 6.24). 
Jesus taught his disciples to pray for their "daily bread." "Therefore 
do not be anxious, saying, 'What shall we eat?' or 'What shall we 
drink?' or 'What shall we wear?' For the Gentiles seek all these 
things; and your heavenly Father knows that you need them all. But 
312 
Religion 
seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things 
shall be yours as well" (Matthew 6.31-32). 
Meanwhile, we do not yet know whether fertility is the sole or 
chief determinant of religious beliefs and behaviors, nor what the 
relation may be between persisting religions, all of which must be 
functional in this regard, and their truth. The true ones, if there are 
any, might be equally fertile with the untrue ones, if there are any; 
or the true ones might be more, or even less fertile, than the untrue 
ones. Fertility and truth might be independent variables. To this re-
lation among fertility, functionality, and truth we will later return 
(Section 4). 
One religion, Judaism, might seem to provide a convincing exam-
ple of the connection between genetics and religion. Judaism has 
been especially effective at keeping racial stock and religious convic-
tions together; most Jews religiously are Jews genetically, and this 
pattern has persisted for thousands of years. But we no sooner note 
the Jewish example, positively corroborating the theory, than we run 
head on into a counterexample that seems decisively to falsify it. 
Jesus, a Jew, launched Christianity, which spread into the uncircum- 
cised, Gentile world; gave up most of the distinctive ritual obser-
vances of Judaism; replaced previously existing religions all over the 
ancient Mediterranean, spread to Europe, and thence to many parts 
of the world. Today approximately one third of humans on Earth, 
well over a billion persons, are Christian, either in conviction or by 
heritage. Compared with these Christians, the Jews are minuscule in 
number. 
Few Christians have any genetic relationship with the early Se-
mitic Christians; Jesus had no offspring at all. The genetic survival 
value of Christianity, if there is any, is smeared out over thousands 
of different racial stocks in hundreds of countries. Christianity may 
be a parental investment handbook, but it seems that anybody can 
use it, around the globe and across the centuries, regardless of ge-
netic origin. There is no identifiable relationship between this or that 
set of genes and Christian belief and behavior. 
The Jewish genes-belief-behavior connection, if there is one, is 
only a fragment of the evidence, most of which dissociates specific 
genes, belief, and behavior. Even the Jews have long insisted on iden-
tifying what was specifically Jewish in their religion (the Abrahamic 
covenant the Mosaic observances), separating this from what in Ju- 
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daism also applied to the Gentiles and was to be a blessing to all 
nations (the Noachic covenant, ethical monotheism). Meanwhile, 
Christianity (as do all other persisting religions) has to result in 
Christians' regenerating themselves biologically over the genera-
tions. After all, one has to be born before one can be born again, even 
if being born again of the spirit then feeds back into the birth rate 
and results in more births in the flesh. If there ever were a divinely 
revealed religion by an ethical monotheist God, one would expect it 
to further the welfare of those to whom it was given. In that sense 
both the theological and the biological theories of the origins of reli-
gion predict the same results: prosperity over generations. If we ob-
serve such prosperity in actual history, either or both theories may 
be true. 
Where religion brings such prosperity, reached as this must be by 
successful surviving through difficulty, by the creativity inseparable 
from suffering (Section 1[4]), this invites persons to return to reflec-
tion on the prolific Earth, the larger genesis into which human gener- 
ativity is now incorporated. Perhaps, to some extent, religion results 
from and is generated by selection for fertility, a coping "myth" max-
imizing offspring or at least inspiring caring for offspring. In that 
respect, there is nothing ungodly about a religion that brings a fruit-
ful life, including both prosperity and children. 
But that truth will have to be put in a larger picture. Religion may 
arise as a coping myth ("the gods are for us and our children"), but 
what is one to say when the truth is found: that there has been 
successful coping over three and a half billion years, in which the 
local self now takes a part and plays a role. Perhaps it was once true, 
in the launching of religion, that the earliest humans mythologized 
these powers as sacred, personified them, and that this proved adap-
tive in child rearing. Perhaps religion is still useful in this way. But 
after that, these generative powers are in fact there surrounding us, 
past and present, to which any worldview must be suitably adapted. 
To see such creative process as sacred, to detect a Creator present, is 
as plausible an interpretive framework as any and is an explanation 
adequate to the results. These prevenient vital powers, sacred pow-
ers, numinous Presence in, with, and under the emergent phenom-
ena, are, after we learn genetics, no less still there in and with the 
genetics underlying the genesis. 
Religion results from and is generated by reflection over, as well 
as participation in, a prolific Earth. Genes generate a mind, which 
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generates religion, which supports genetic survival. Such a mind, 
formulating its religion, protects its offspring, and also encounters 
the surrounding genesis in natural history, recorded in the genes of 
others, humans and nonhumans. Such a mind encounters also the 
human genius generating the myriad cultures, including that of its 
own heritage. The local self with its family line participates in wider 
communities of shared values, and an account of that too is signifi-
cant in the religious challenge. We are back to the question of "oth-
ers" and the sharing of values, now in religious form. 
3. RELIGION AND ALTRUISM 
Close analysis – Wilson, Reynolds, and Tanner were claiming – will 
show that all successful religion is really "selfish," in the sense of 
serving one's genes. In view of the fact that the most successful relig-
ions routinely urge altruism and censure selfishness, sociobiologists 
and behavioral psychologists will have to show that this altruism is 
only apparent and that these religions do in fact support biological 
selfishness. Or one will have to find some account(s) to give of this 
emphasis on altruism that can reinterpret it within the general bio-
logical theory. Or perhaps the altruism will be revealing counterev- 
idence. Religion generates a social phenomenon that biology is in-
competent to handle, either to explain or to evaluate. If so, such 
naturalistic accounts of the genesis of religion will be partial, at best. 
Religious accounts of the genesis of this altruism might be comple-
mentary or corrective to the biological accounts. 
As with ethics before, we need to remember that religion is more 
than altruism. Religions too are concerned with justice, fairness, eq-
uitable sharing of resources, prudent care of oneself, a right relation-
ship to God or the gods; with placating the spirits; or with reaching 
nirvana, or union with Brahman, and so on. In the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, the desired goal is often said to be a state of righteousness. 
In the vocabulary recommended here, this optimizes values, now 
religious values, both in the personal lives of believers and in the 
lives of those they benefit. 
(1) Religion Generating Altruism 
Many religions urge altruism; this is as frequent a theme as is in-
creased fertility (Hefner 1993, chapters 11-12). Judaism summarized 
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its ten commandments into two: love God and neighbor, which Jesus 
enthusiastically endorsed. New Testament writers prefer the Greek 
term agape over eros. Eros is an acquisitive love, responding to value 
in the other and being fulfilled by that other; agape is a giving love, 
offered regardless of value in the other and any reciprocating benefit. 
Eros may be a good thing in its place, but agape cares for the other 
more sacrificially. These writers did not think that philea, brotherly 
love, was profound enough to embody the Christian ideal. One 
ought to love the other as one does oneself. Augustine summed up 
the Christian ethic: love and do what you will. He contrasted the 
self-centered love, concupiscence, characteristic of Babylon, with an 
other-(altrus)-love, caritas, characteristic of Jerusalem. 
Buddhism's first commandment is noninjury to others, ahimsa; the 
bodhisattva takes a vow of karuna, compassion on all beings: 
I have made the vow to save all beings. All beings I must set 
free. The whole world of living beings I must rescue from the 
terrors of birth-and-death. . . . My endeavours do not merely aim 
at my own deliverance. For with the help of the boat of the 
thought of all-knowledge, I must rescue all these beings from the 
stream of Samsarsa. (Vajradhvaja Sutra, 280-281) 
The four noble truths locate the fundamental human disorder in 
thirst and clinging, in a grasping that feeds and satisfies the self; the 
route to salvation is by an enlightenment, nirvana, where one sees 
that the self is unreal, anatta. 
Contented, easily supported, with few duties, of simple liveli- 
hood, controlled in senses, discreet, not impudent, he [the Bo- 
dhisattva] should not be greedily attached to families. . . . Just as 
a mother would protect her only child even at the risk of her 
own life, even so let one cultivate a boundless heart towards all 
beings. Let one's thoughts of boundless love pervade the whole 
world – above, below and across – without any obstruction, 
without any hatred, without any enmity. (Suttanipata, I, 8) 
That certainly doesn't sound like selfish genes. Neither agape nor 
karuna seems to be explicitly or implicitly promoting the self; this 
altruism runs counter to the fertility elsewhere vigorously sought in 
religion. What is one to make of religion exhorting altruism? 
There is no problem when the altruism so promoted binds kin 
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group loyalty and facilitates tribal group reciprocity. This promotes 
inclusive fitness. Benefits redound to self and/or kin. But is this ac-
count of only-apparent altruism always plausible? Mother Teresa 
was certainly behaving with biological somatic altruism, since the 
food she fed to Indian children she herself could not eat (Muggeridge 
1973). She was also behaving with genetic altruism, since Mother 
Teresa had no children herself, and many of the Indian children she 
fed have themselves grown up and reproduced. Nor is she related to 
these children. 
This is hardly reciprocal altruism. Although she benefited nonrel- 
atives, there was little resulting benefit to Mother Teresa's somatic 
self. There is no cause to think that Mother Teresa went to India 
because of the likely reciprocators there, or stayed many decades for 
this reason, or that her efforts in India were helping her relatives 
back in Yugoslavia and Albania to reproduce. Mother Teresa was not 
backscratching with unrelated others, nor did she expect these others 
to backscratch her nieces and nephews. There is no particular prob-
lem if Mother Teresa received an occasional bit of help in return for 
her charity, if for instance some young girl reciprocated and cooked 
food for Mother Teresa. But the net flow of benefits cannot be to 
Mother Teresa; the recipients of aid are, after all, the poor of India. 
There is moral altruism, if we are able to give any credence to 
Mother Teresa's verbal reports. Whether or not we accept her re-
ports, just observing her behavior alone, the biological selfishness 
interpretation is rather implausible. What is the evidence that she 
was not doing what she intended, helping nonrelated others, and 
doing it because of her religious convictions about divine love? Reli-
gion was also operating with the Good Samaritan. This joining gives 
us no cause to suspect either the morality or the religion. 
Mother Teresa ate daily, conserving her biological somatic value, 
and there is no cause to censure her for selfishness in doing so. She 
also cared for the intrinsic values in those she fed. There is some 
reciprocity as those values are shared, backscratching. No religion 
protests when persons help each other out. In all this there results 
much conservation of biological genetic value. The Indian children 
live to reproduce. Mother Teresa knew, of course, that not everyone 
can or should be religiously celibate. There would be no next gener-
ation. 
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(2) Religion Generating Pseudoaltruism? 
But, comes the protest, most persons are not like Mother Teresa; most 
look out for their own interests, and those of their next of kin. Most 
are sinners, few are saints, and, even among the saints, seldom do 
we find those as charitable and self-denying as Mother Teresa. What 
is protested is, one should notice, also what Mother Teresa herself, 
in her religion, taught: that by their first nature humans are selfish, 
and that such nature needs redeeming before humans can operate 
with this regenerated nature. That real sinners outnumber ideal 
saints has never been taken to discredit religion, although religion 
might be discredited if it could produce no working examples at all 
of the sorts of persons it recommends. Religion does in fact produce 
numerous such models. They are the myriad exemplars of the reli-
gious heritage, and the devout follow them with some measure of 
ideal mixed with real. 
Alexander, Ruse, and Wilson claimed earlier, dealing with the 
Good Samaritan (Chapter 5, Section 3[1]), that the whole process 
works better if people are deceived about their deepest motives. We 
call this pseudo-pseudoaltruism, because not only is the behavior only 
apparently altruistic, really self-interest, but the intention too is ap-
parently altruistic, as the selfish intent is screened off from the moral 
agent. Religion has a particular genius for inculcating this deception. 
The gods command this altruistic behavior. Loving God urges loving 
one's neighbor. If one can come to believe that, then there will be 
zeal indeed; one's real motives will be rationalized as obeying God. 
Religion is an especially powerful incentive reinforcing this (appar-
ent) altruism. Perhaps altruism even originated in religion. Until 
modern times, most ethical behavior was entwined with religious 
behavior. The discussion in the previous chapter left something im-
portant out, assuming that ethics arose from mutual cooperative ad-
vantage, a social contract, without any serious look into its historical 
integration into religions. Ethics needs the sanction of religion to get 
established. 
On this account, from here onward, one will not be able to ask 
religious people what they think. Humans are doubly mistaken, both 
about the altruism and about god(s). But one can watch what they 
do. These doubly mistaken humans are nevertheless productive; 
their mistake recouples religion and fertility in a surprising way. If 
the theory is true at a first level, one would expect ethics and religion 
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to remain tribal, favoring kin selection, where the nearby genes are. 
The religions preach that "charity begins at home." Such charity, a 
misnomer, is actually genetic selfishness. Be that as it may, no clas-
sical religion teaches that charity stops at home, and yet this is the 
teaching one should expect, if religion were selected to promote a 
familial genome. Over recorded history, this has not been the trend 
at all. Religion and ethics are tribal at the start, but both together go 
universal, replacing tribal religions. Seemingly, that trend should 
have been selected against. 
Charity in religion expands beyond the family, as was evident in 
Mother Teresa's actions, and now the genetic theory has to accom-
modate this by supposing that the charity is really reciprocal bar-
gaining for benefits, gained by group association. The beyond-home 
charity ends up producing likely reciprocators. Recalling indirect, 
social altruism (Chapter 5, Section 2[4]), reciprocation does not have 
to be one on one; the religious operator is setting up a general cul-
tural climate in which there is reciprocity. The individual does well 
in a Christian society, no matter whether the other Christians are 
genetically related, no matter whether the help received and given is 
in direct exchange, or statistically averaged out in a Christian com-
munity. 
Religion is not adverse to one's being a good neighbor, or having 
good neighbors either. The organic model, one body with many 
members mutually supporting each other, is a favorite model of the 
church (1 Corinthians 12). But, in the end, when the question, Who 
is my neighbor?, is asked, the answer comes in terms of who is in 
need that I can help meet, not who is likely to reciprocate with net 
gain to myself. Universal morality has regularly been religiously 
based in the classical world religions – those religions that moved 
from tribal and national levels to become international and intergen- 
erational faiths. 
The pseudoaltruist will have to say that such moral persons were 
just setting up a world moral climate in which they themselves were 
most likely to prosper genetically. Charity is always a misnomer. 
Mother Teresa did not gain any personal benefit, but she did get the 
spread of the benefits of religion from India back to Yugoslavia, ben-
efits that in her case started in Yugoslavia, her childhood home 
where she was reared religiously and later moved to India – benefits 
that started centuries before in Palestine and once moved to Yugosla-
via, being shared by all who transmitted this religious altruism en 
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route. That kind of religion is rather curiously selfish, setting up this 
pervasive cultural climate; indeed it has become almost indistin-
guishable from what the ethical monotheisms have taught. Neverthe-
less, Wilson is sure that, one way or another, Mother Teresa, even in 
her sainthood, remained "cheerfully subordinate" to her "biological 
imperatives" (1978, p. 166). 
Mutatis mutandis, one can give the same account of the spread of 
Islam, with its ideas of universal brotherhood, and even of the spread 
of nonmonotheistic Buddhism from India to China and Japan, moti-
vated by the bodhisattva's ideal of universal love. 
One can adamantly hang on to the selfishness paradigm, but this 
is a topsy-turvy kind of selfishness that has to act on universal altru-
ism, and evangelize this faith to the world, that is, to share it with 
everybody else, before it works most efficiently to one's own benefit. 
It is odd that to serve their genetic interests people have to go to 
elaborate efforts to do just the opposite, to believe universal creeds, 
share them with others, act on universal altruism, build characters 
that are caring, fair, sympathetic, forgiving, magnanimous. One can 
say, if one insists, that all this is just reputation building, pretense 
that creates a climate in which the pretender and his kin prosper as 
a result of the reciprocity generated. But it is difficult to see how they 
prosper to the detriment of the others who are the beneficiaries of 
this allegedly pretended altruism. None of this is really very plausi-
ble anymore. Perhaps the charity isn't just apparent after all. Maybe 
it is time for a paradigm switch. 
(3) Religion Generating Unsuccessful Altruism? 
But first, perhaps one can save the general theory that religion is 
fertility-maximizing another way. There is also a negative, unsuc-
cessful version of the theory: religion does indeed produce real altru-
ism and this results in the genetic failure of such persons – contrary 
to all claimed in the previous section. Religious persons benefit the 
genes of others, who outreproduce them, and they themselves go 
extinct. This is a rather surprising conclusion, and one will have to 
find a convincing account of the anomalous persistence of religion 
although its practitioners are constantly failing genetically. 
Struck by the degree and intensity of altruism exemplified in 
Mother Teresa, sociobiologists and behavioral psychologists may try 
a revised account. In addition to pseudoaltruism, there can be in- 
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duced altruism (Chapter 5, Section 3[2]). This does indeed serve the 
interests of the helped at both somatic and genetic cost to the helper, 
but it is "an evolutionary mistake'' (Alexander 1987, p. 191). This 
switches things around. Now believers are tricked into losing. De-
voutly religious persons are conned into benefiting others and will 
have fewer offspring themselves. Priests and nuns fail to benefit ei-
ther themselves or their blood lines genetically. They are dupes, but 
they do help others to succeed. They help some people directly, who 
have more offspring in result, and their ideal, though disastrous 
were everyone to practice it, produces enough spillover morality to 
help the lay reproducer. The Indian girls have children, Mother Te-
resa died childless, and her relatives in Yugoslavia and Albania do 
not have many children either. 
If this is true, however, we will expect that the genes for becoming 
a priest or nun will disappear from the population, and society will 
be in worse shape, not having these clerical benefits spilling over to 
the lay reproducers – and similarly and proportionately for any lay 
believers duped into such assistance given to their fellow lay Chris-
tians. The masses of selfish people will exploit any altruism; every-
body will cheat on altruists, and they are always losing. In just that 
proportion by which religious persons overdo their altruism, erring 
into induced rather than merely apparent altruism, their genes will 
be selected against. "In a world of egoists, the only one who suffers 
from exhortations that 'Everyone should try to be like Jesus,' is the 
one who succeeds" (Alexander 1987, p. 127): succeeds in being like 
Jesus, that is, but fails reproductively, as did Jesus, and so succeeds 
in becoming extinct. 
Mother Teresas are one in a million, priests and nuns are one in 
ten thousand, but lay believers have children routinely and care for 
them with religious zeal. They may praise their saints, preachers, 
prophets, missionaries, but what they are really doing is exploiting 
them. Parishioners get direct help from them and such figures sym-
bolize by exaggeration what everybody needs a little of for his or her 
own good. One will expect these genes for an overdose of altruism 
to be rare. But why should they be there at all? There is a ready 
explanation why most persons should be easily educable into a lim-
ited altruism; this in fact serves their genetic self-interests. But we 
have no explanation yet why these evolutionary mistakes should 
persist, rare though they are. 
Perhaps they are just a repeated error, like Down's syndrome or 
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(some say) homosexuality, neither of which facilitates reproduction. 
Such a tendency to repeated error might not be surprising, since 
there is a beneficial altruism (backscratching and winning) that is 
behaviorally almost indiscernible from a loser's overaltruism, distin-
guishable mostly by excess in degree, and everybody's intentions are 
screened off both from themselves and from others. The right kind 
of altruism, a fertility-maximizing pseudoaltruism, and a religion to 
exhort it, are good things genetically, though too much of them, uni-
versal morality and real altruism, is a mistake. Some unlucky mu-
tants in every generation will edge over too far. Religion is like fer-
tilizer; indeed religion is a kind of fertilizer. More is better up to a 
point, and more after that produces opposite results. A few people 
will regularly and counterproductively overfertilize. 
Is this account plausible? Here one must remember that just this 
universal morality (an alleged overdose), religiously based, has been 
classically successful as a cognitive idea. Perhaps the one-in-a-million 
or one-in-ten-thousand mutant superbly exemplifies the idea, but 
leading intellectual traditions (Christianity and Judaism in the West; 
Buddhism in the East) have been conned into this idea, as an ideal 
though not as often real as it should be. The symbol catches on and 
convinces many. It is a quite a fertile idea, spreading globally, even 
if there is an overdose problem. The altruistic impulse does not just 
travel genetically from one generation to the next, passed down in 
modest amounts because of its reproductive success or in harmful 
amounts as a recurrent genetic error. The altruistic impulse is spread 
by conversion, by evangelism, by proselytizing; billions of persons 
come to hold it creedally if not behaviorally. 
That is a strange mutant indeed, fertile though erroneous, one that 
arises rarely and harmfully, but that convinces intellectually though 
not behaviorally the many who become converts to the most success-
ful religions globally. We need to explain why people around the 
world and across the centuries have been intellectually persuaded to 
accept a belief that they are not genetically disposed to adopt. Nor is 
this just a genetic problem of a few screwy mutants convincing mil-
lions of persons to believe what they are not disposed to believe; it 
is an intellectual one as well. Everybody has to have the wrong the-
ory (universal, divinely willed altruism) to get the right result (fertil-
ity). 
Holding onto the self-interest paradigm tenaciously, its defenders 
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can reply that people everywhere need the overbelief (belief in too 
much altruism, commanded by God) in order behaviorally to act 
with a functionally minimum altruism (enough to produce recipro-
cation). The evolutionary mistake, manifested recurrently in these 
symbolic saints, provides the essential belief without which the 
masses cannot function well in their cultures. Maybe that is convinc-
ing. Maybe it is holding onto a theory when the evidence is begin-
ning to mount against it. We are starting to wonder whether this 
altruism-really-selfishness  thesis,  modified into  an  altruism- 
really-mistake thesis, modified into an altruism-really-functionally- 
important-mistake thesis, modified into a wrong-theory-necessary-to- 
produce-right-results thesis is a paradigm proved true or a paradigm 
absorbing and eating up all the evidence. Perhaps it isn't a mistake 
at all; maybe culture needs different rules than genetic nature needs. 
Perhaps we have been too generous to the saints. Already we have 
noticed subtle exploitation in religion, and this may be more wide-
spread. Consider another kind of induced altruism, this time one by 
which the leaders gain and the multitudes lose. Religious leaders too 
can be self-aggrandizing; lay believers too can be the duped. The 
masses are conned into believing that God wills that they should faith-
fully obey the commandments, not to steal, or lie, or covet; to be hon-
est, hardworking; to keep promises; to contribute sarificially to the 
church. Such sanctified morality is really serving the interests of those 
in power ecclesiastically. Where the church supports the nation, as 
with an established religion, this can be also political exploitation. 
"Religion is above all the process by which individuals are per-
suaded to subordinate their immediate self-interest to the interests of 
the group. Votaries are expected to make short-term physiological 
sacrifices for their own long-term genetic gains" (Wilson 1978, 
p. 176). Usually this does work to the longer-range benefit of the 
persons so subordinated. But it also means that such a subordinating 
tendency can easily be exploited by political and ecclesiastical lead-
ers, who gather benefits from the subordinated. Now the morally 
faithful plebeian Christian citizens lose and have fewer children in 
result, while the leaders win. With the commoners kept in place con-
tributing their support, the leaders outreproduce them. This decep-
tion too will work better if even the leaders are explicitly unaware of 
what is really going on. "Self-deception by shamans and priests per-
fects their own performance and enhances the deception practiced 
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on their constituents" (Wilson 1978, p. 176). Both the exploiters and 
the exploited think that the divine command theory is true. Wilson 
says: 
Religions, like other human institutions, evolve so as to further 
the welfare of their practitioners. Because this demographic ben-
efit applies to the group as a whole, it can be gained in part by 
altruism and exploitation, with certain segments profiting at the 
expense of others. Alternatively, it can arise as the sum of gen-
erally increased individual finesses. The resulting distinction in 
social terms is between the more oppressive and the more benef-
icent religions. All religions are probably oppressive to some de-
gree, especially when they are promoted by chiefdoms and 
states. The tendency is intensified when societies compete, since 
religion can be effectively harnessed to the purposes of warfare 
and economic exploitation. (1975a, p. 561) 
No one would claim that religion has never been used for exploita-
tion, least of all the seminal religious reformers, who are often in-
tensely critical of ecclesiastical and political powers. 
But this error of too much citizen-practitioner morality that lets 
commoners get suckered into serving bishop or king is exactly what 
should be selected against. The bishops were celibate and didn't have 
any children at all; kings, nobles, and chiefs were a minority, one in 
a hundred or one in a thousand. There is no evidence that the rulers 
outbred those they subjugated. It would be surprising if the machi-
nations of small groups of elitist rulers could exploit whole popula-
tions into behavior that was to the commoners' breeding disadvan-
tage and do this continually over the long millennia of human 
history. If so, the wrong genes (out there in the subjugated masses) 
have to be the most common ones. The theory doesn't predict that at 
all. 
There is one thing the theory does predict, but one has to turn to 
the present and future to test this. If the theory is true, when believ-
ers find out about it, they will cease their religious behavior. They 
will start doing whatever it is that does increase their fertility or 
promote their own self-interest. A "rational" person will not want to 
be conned into producing benefits to others at cost to himself. Reli-
gion does not work unless it is well-disguised, and to find out the 
truth of the matter is to cease to be religious. 
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(4) Religion Generating Complementary Altruism 
There is another possibility, developed by Donald T. Campbell (1991, 
1975). Religion produces successful altruism, humanizing persons for 
the passage from nature to culture. Humans evolved with animal 
genes, selected to conserve values under the regimes of nature, 
where genetic transmission is virtually the sole process for the trans-
mission of information. But humans form transmissible cultures, and 
the requirements of culture differ. Natural selection is relaxed, coop-
eration is intensified, educability is vital, acquired learning is essen-
tial. To elevate prehumans into humans, morality arises, almost al-
ways religion-based. Morality moves humans away from their 
merely genetic instincts toward more appropriate behavior in cul-
ture. "Social evolution has had to counter individual selfish tenden-
cies which biological evolution has continued to select as a result of 
the genetic competition among the cooperators" (1975, p. 1115; 1991). 
Genes are selected that are educable for culture, but the content of 
such education includes the moral heritage, supplied by cultural, not 
genetic transmission. This content urges altruism, and the urging has 
to overshoot to succeed. Those religions best succeed that most help 
humans to pull away from their genetic instincts toward the cooper-
ative needs in culture. This best works if they preach not just tribal 
but universal altruism. When such altruism is preached, the result is 
behavioral change in the direction of more altruism, less selfishness. 
To illustrate, Campbell imagines a sort of selfishness-altruism 
meter, with complete selfishness at one end of the scale (0 altruism) 
and complete altruism at the other (100 percent altruism) (Fig. 6.2). 
Complete selfishness is not successful even in the animal world, cer-
tainly not among social primates, who cooperate extensively. Kin 
altruism plus the limited amounts of reciprocal altruism of which 
primates are capable might put the biological optimum at 30 percent 
on the altruism scale. (The numbers are only illustrative, not empiri-
cally obtained.) For humans in their exodus to transmissible cultures 
this is not enough. The religious preachings (here scaled as 100 per-
cent altruism in ideal, but see the caution later) are required to pull 
human behavior over toward the biosocial optimum for culture, 
which might be 60 percent altruism. Even the best religions are not 
so successful as would be operationally ideal; humans fall short of 




















Figure 6.2. Meter illustrating tensions on a dimension of selfishness-altruism. 
From Donald T. Campbell, "On the Conflicts between Biological and Social 
Evolution and between Psychology and Moral Tradition," American Psycholo-
gist 30(1975): 1103-26, p. 1118. Copyright © 1975 by the American Psycholog-
ical Association. Reprinted with permission. 
tugging of their self-interests. The net result is that humans operate 
in culture with perhaps 50 percent selfishness, 50 percent altruism. 
On this view, it is the religions, preaching altruism, that make 
culture possible; they humanize us. Without them, we are beasts. 
There is nothing pejorative about a beast acting like a beast, but a 
human ought to be something more. Beasts (primates) operate with 
a nonmoral, minimal (30 percent) altruism that is properly in their 
genetic interests, appropriate for the conservation of value at that 
level. Humans move toward a moral, more charitable altruism (60 
percent), not only proper to but requisite for culture. At least in the 
behavior that religions produce, stretching humans away from our 
lingering, ancestral genetic dispositions, the religions are right. This 
is what ought to be in culture, following exodus from nature, appro-
priate for the conservation of emerging values at the cultural level. 
The achievement of conscience, coupled with religious vision, is a 
surprising historical development making it possible to be human. 
That emergence is belied by the simplicity of the meter scale, sug-
gesting only a quantitative where there is qualitative change. To 
think that the "selfishness" at the zero end is censurable is a category 
mistake. Altruism too changes its meaning as there is movement 
upscale; it enlarges its scope, universalizes, and becomes moral. 
Religion now does produce a successful altruism, complementary 
to the biologically produced self-interest. Religions help humans to 
break away from what the genes, unaided, would otherwise pro-
duce. Religious ethics is superposed on the genes, facilitating the 
transposition to culture. Nevertheless, the religions preach a univer- 
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sal altruism contrary to our best interests in culture; they overshoot 
their mark. If their urging is heeded too enthusiastically, the result 
will not be optimum for culture. Here the saints may serve as sym-
bols in the 80 percent and above range, beneficial because they move 
others up to 50 percent. More saints might be more beneficial, mov-
ing us nearer the 60 percent biosocial optimum. 
Also, Judaism and Christianity couple what universal altruism 
they urge with a respect for the self, so it is not true that the religions 
urge sheer altruism and nothing else. As earlier noted, Christianity, 
Judaism, Islam, and others commend a righteousness that combines 
justice and mercy, in which altruism is only one component. Relig-
ions encourage self-actualizing, though they know that this is not the 
whole ideal. So the meter ideal is a doubtful 100 percent, since the 
Golden Rule recommends loving others as oneself, not instead of 
oneself. This would be 50 percent – 50 percent if one insists on scal-
ing it, though the recommendation may be about the quality of this 
love as much as about the quantitative amount. 
Such altruism, notice, is progressively less tightly coupled to the 
genes. Disciples need not have the genes of the prophets, seers, and 
saviors who launched these teachings. In a successful world religion, 
they seldom do. People do better with genes plastic enough to track 
the best religion, whether their blood kin launched it or not. When 
they convert to these better religions, people are moved to act not 
just by their genetic programming; nor are they moved to act only in 
the interests of self, family, and kin. They are moved to act by what 
makes culture possible, including their own satisfactory life in cul-
ture. They convert to, inherit, and reinherit over generations a moti-
vating worldview, classically oriented by religion. 
This makes possible the rearing of another generation of humans, 
because good religion brings cultural prosperity. But just this same 
good religion has to be universally shared; it generates concern for 
other humans near and fair, relating to them with the moral values of 
justice, love, and respect. The commitment that one has to make 
transcends one's genetics, if one is to be stretched over, lifted up to 
sufficient altruism for high-quality social life. The fertility dimension, 
though it cannot and ought not to disappear, is subdued before the 
cultural enrichment theme. The biosocial optimum on the metered 
scale is not just to be measured by my progeny, not by escalating 
birth rates in my tribe, or population explosion in my nation, or even 
in the world, but by a harmonious society in which one generation 
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successfully transmits its valued achievements to the next, leaving 
them open to new achievements. 
This can only be done if the best religious and moral insights are 
among the skills transmitted. Religions will, if you like, be tested for 
their capacity to do this, and the best ones will survive. The claim is 
not so much that the genes are the secret of religion, as that religion 
is the secret that makes possible the human passage from genetic 
nature to transmissible culture. Religion is the key to our humanity. 
Religion is required for the genesis of culture; cultures are required 
to generate religion, else they go extinct. 
Such an account makes the future problematic. If religion disap-
pears, humans will revert to being beasts – unless they can find 
something else to do the job of religion. Perhaps a rational morality, 
autonomous from religion, can command such obedience. But there 
will not be much hope in looking to genetics to supply such ethics. 
What is needed is a culturally acquired motivational power that 
pulls away from genetics, that genetics itself cannot supply. 
(5) Religion Converting Others 
There can be too much focus on biological fertility. Religion has to 
be understood as reproduction cognitively, believers making more 
converts, as well as biologically, believers having babies. In analogy 
to science, a scientific idea outcompetes its competitors, and wins 
adherents, and they fare well in their world. Religions have fertile 
ideas, and people adopt them the better to cope. But the transmission 
process is neural, not genetic. One has to be indoctrinated into a 
religion. 
"A form of group selection operates in the competition between 
sects. Those that can gain adherents survive, those that cannot fail" 
(Wilson 1975a, p. 561). We know before we ask that surviving relig-
ions must recruit adherents from one generation to the next. Those 
that can proselytize increase. That is tautological. If the claim is that 
those religions succeed that make the most converts (where success 
means making the most converts), who will doubt it? We do not 
need biology to be convinced of that. 
Biologically speaking, the problem now is that, if this is effective 
proselytizing, the new adherents soon cease to have any genetic re-
lationship to the proselytizer. Only a minuscule fraction of the billion 
or so persons who are Christians have the Jewish genes of Christi- 
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anity's founders. Most do not have the Greek or Roman genes of the 
first generations of Christians either. What good are all these Chris-
tians around the world to the Semitic, Greek, or Roman launchers of 
Christianity, or their present-day descendants? 
Wilson claims that the function of religion is to produce group 
loyalty for the local or tribal survival unit. Those who were indoctri-
nated with primitive myths and rituals had intense and unquestion-
ing loyalty to their society, and they obeyed their leaders' decisions 
in situations in which it was more important to act in concert than to 
think critically and independently. Such concerted group action con-
veyed survival value on all, on average, so that it was to any individ-
ual's probable advantage to cooperate, even though he had some risk 
of losing (being killed in battle, for instance). Under the influence of 
such religions, persons acted altruistically, but this was really pseu- 
doaltruism, because it was in their genetic self-interest to bond to 
others in this way. 
Such an explanation has a certain plausibility dealing with tribal 
religions. Perhaps it explains certain contemporary phenomena, such 
as the kamikaze pilots of World War II, dying for the emperor. But 
it is powerless to explain the universalism in the major world faiths. 
The most successful world religions have spread widely, typically as 
a result of the missionary activity of their adherents. Christianity has 
spread from its origins in the Semitic Middle East throughout the 
Greek and Roman worlds, throughout Europe, North America, and 
even the world. Buddhism spread from India to China and Japan, to 
California. 
The Muslim armies advanced outside the Semitic world, across 
North Africa, into Spain, into India. That makes sense if one is gain-
ing plunder in one's group self-interest or inducing others to serve 
one, but it makes no sense if one is spreading a religion that benefits 
nonrelatives. Even this "religion of the sword" was as much spread, 
southward in Africa, by the Sufis with their mystical visions. It was 
entirely so spread in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, going 
where Muslim armies never went. Dar-al-Islam, the household of Is-
lam, joins in daily prayer millions facing Mecca in solidarity and 
equality under God. Every one of the five principal pillars – conver-
sion by profession of faith, daily prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, joining other Muslims from around the earth in 
common submission to God – violates genetics in the name of uni-
versal fraternity. 
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If the function of a religion is to provide fervent loyalty for a tribal 
group, urging one's religion on aliens is exactly the wrong behavior. 
Missionary activity is helping to ensure the replication of genes un-
like one's own. If one has a religion that serves his genes, holds his 
society together well, and produces numerous offspring, then the last 
thing he wants to do is share this religion with others. He would be 
giving the secret away.  That would be altruism of the most self- 
defeating kind! Proselytizing those with foreign genes is the worst 
religious mistake you can make from a genetic viewpoint, and yet it 
has been the secret of success of all the world's great religions: evan-
gelism in Christianity, or the bodhisattva's vow in Buddhism. 
Even Judaism, the one classical faith that might first seem best to 
fit the religion-genes theory, belies it. "I will make of you a great 
nation and ... by you all the families of the earth shall bless them-
selves" (Genesis 12.1-3). On the genetic explanation, the second half 
of the promise undoes the first half. To be a people chosen by Yah- 
weh to prosper in a promised land and to have descendants as nu-
merous as the stars – that is to have a religion that leaves one with 
many offspring. But to be chosen by God to launch a religion in 
which everybody else also gets blessed? That is no genetic gain at 
all. That is a self-defeating religion, foolishly altruistic, and it will be 
selected against. On the genetic view, the first half of the promise has 
caused Judaism to survive for three thousand years; the second half 
of the promise is paradoxically antithetical to the first half. But 
surely, outside the genetic view, it is quite plausible to argue that 
ethical monotheism has had benefits that many others could share, 
and that this happened when (via Christianity), the Romans, the Ger-
mans, the British, the Americans adopted it, 99 44/100 percent of 
them without any Jewish genes at all. 
The tribal group does need to reach a functionally efficient size, 
and one might want to indoctrinate enough others, preferably kin-
dred or at least those of the same race, to reach this critical size. 
Beyond that, why should one send missionaries abroad to convert 
the Gentiles? They live in other nations and are not part of one's own 
political or economic survival unit. This preaching to the uncon-
verted is not predicted by the theory, nor explained retrodictively. 
The Great Commission is, "Go therefore and make disciples of all 
nations" (Matthew 28.19). But the "Catholicism" is counterproductive 
to any leaving of more Semitic genes in the next generation. 
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These outsiders from afar coming into the faith will convey incom-
ing benefits only if they are needed reciprocators or can be exploited. 
They have to be made allies or colonies politically or economically. 
But evangelism is not always covert politics or economics. In the 
classical religions, the question ceases to be what tribe or clan a per-
son is from, whether he or she is ally or enemy. The question is, Can 
he or she be saved? The secret of success is preaching a universal 
concern. Should we then argue that a group, covertly or tacitly to 
defend itself, discovers a faith that it shares with as many others as 
it can persuade around the world? That seems odd, that group self- 
defense requires proselytizing the world. A world mission is not 
covert intergroup altruism. If intergroup altruism must become intra- 
group altruism in order to retain its intergroup altruism, we can 
begin to doubt whether all these other groups evangelized are really 
nothing but needed reciprocators or subtly exploited aliens. No 
doubt one nation benefits when another is converted to a just and 
charitable form of life. Every nation benefits from harmonious inter-
national relations, to which religiously based ethical convictions 
about "the brotherhood of man" or "universal human rights" or 
"loving your neighbor as yourself" may contribute. But there is no 
reason to think that this expanding of altruism to the ecumenical 
limit is maximizing the group interest of those who launched Chris-
tianity. 
Behavioral psychologists generally hold that humans are geneti-
cally inclined to xenophobia. The gene-fertility theory easily predicts 
this inclination in animals and has found it confirmed. "This xeno-
phobic principle has been documented in virtually every group of 
animals displaying higher forms of social organization" (Wilson 
1975a, p. 249, cf. pp. 286-287). This may have carried over to our 
early human ancestors. Possibly for millions of years natural selec-
tion favored those genes that caused the protohumans to be altruistic 
toward members of their own group but intolerant of outsiders. Pos-
sibly, humans today still have that innate tendency. Possibly, primi-
tive religions are of this xenophobic kind; some sectarian religions 
today remain partisan. Possibly the principle works in politics. "Xe-
nophobia becomes a political virtue" (Wilson, 1975a, p. 565). Love 
your neighbors and hate your enemies. 
The one thing impossible is a xenophobic universal altruism. "The 
essential characteristic of a tribe is that it should follow a double 
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standard of morality – one kind of behavior for in-group relations, 
another for out-group" (Wilson 19753, p. 565).1 But the major world 
faiths have escaped this, not only in ideal but also in the real propor-
tionately to their success. And it seems impossible to explain this 
"xenophilia" on the basis of genetics. Somehow, somewhere, they 
reached insight into a better standard of what is right. 
"You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor 
and hate your enemy. But I say to you, Love your enemies" (Mat-
thew 5.43). Putting it another way, we even have to "hate" our fam-
ilies to be disciples of this universal love. "If anyone comes to me 
and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children 
and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my 
disciple" (Luke 14.26). That certainly doesn't sound like promoting 
one's genetic interests. "Whatever living beings there may be – feeble 
or strong, long or tall, stout, medium, short, small, or large, seen or 
unseen, those dwelling near or far, those who are born and those 
who are yet to be born – may all beings, without exception, be 
happy-minded" (Suttanipata, I, 8). If Christian and Buddhist say this 
universalism came by divine insight, prophecy, revelation, or mystic 
vision, there is nothing in genetic theory to gainsay such claims. 
One converts to a religion culturally. "The idea of God" has "high 
survival value" in the pool of memes, as Dawkins puts it. "The idea 
of God is copied ... readily by successive generations of individual 
brains. God exists, if only in the form of a meme with high survival 
value, or infective power, in the environment provided by human 
culture" (1989, p. 193). Large numbers of peoples have adopted relig-
ions that did not come with their ancestral genetic sets. One does not 
need Semitic genes to be a Christian, any more than Plato's genes to 
be a Platonist, nor Einstein's genes to adopt the theory of relativity. 
Religious beliefs overleap genes. But that does not confirm the reli-
gion/fertility hypothesis; it falsifies it. 
Perhaps there is a competition between religions – some win, 
some lose – and in result people often convert to a faith originated 
by somebody other than their progenitors. Nevertheless people settle 
in on some religious belief that promotes their fertility. But this faith 
reached by conversion in the parents has to be transmitted to the 
children, who will be, as were their parents before, subject to prose-
lytizing. A religion, to stay around, has to have a reproductive capac- 
1 Quoting Garrett Hardin. 
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ity cognitively. These beliefs must be transmitted nongenetically, 
though, when adopted, they promote fertility. But here the cognitive 
content of the successful religions is universalistic, and if so, the chil-
dren will soon be spreading this fertility-producing faith to nonfam- 
ily and nongroup aliens. Perhaps they will be going off on mission-
ary journeys again or contributing money to support such missions. 
Once we allow that a faith spreads by its persuasive powers, and 
that a vital element is universal altruism, it becomes impossible to 
keep the benefits local and in-group. 
The function of religion is not simply to produce unthinking 
group loyalty, but to deal with many aspects of human nature that 
need to be curbed if optimal social cooperation is to be achieved, for 
example, selfishness, pride, greed, dishonesty, covetousness, anger, 
jealousy, sloth – aspects of human nature that are not genetically 
specific but are ubiquitous problems of Homo sapiens. These problems 
indisputably have some roots in our genetic past, but these short-
comings are common to all flesh. The religions that have stood the 
test of time have unanimously taught that humans must discipline 
and inhibit many tendencies in human nature. Here biology 
"frames" religion only in the sense that generic and genetically based 
traits have to be addressed by religion, but the solutions are supra- 
genetic. The identity question has shifted from genetic identity 
(Chapter 2, Section 1) to religious identity, a nongenetic level. Chris-
tians around the world, confessing a common creed, share a cogni-
tive identity. Values – now valuable answers – are getting shared 
again, rather than being something selfishly defended. 
One is no longer dealing with just the logic of the genes. These 
religions criss-cross races, nations, and centuries; they operate in di-
verse times and cultures and involve some logic of the mind that is 
tracking what is transgenetically right or of value, no matter whether 
one has this or that set of genes. Genetic success is necessary but not 
sufficient to explain this universalism. It makes more sense to say 
that such religions were discovering what is transtribally, transcul- 
turally valuable. Something has emerged for which biology is not 
giving us a convincing account. 
The rules change. Values are no longer defended at the level of 
natural selection, primarily. The value activity is now at a level that 
is culturally enjoyed and transmitted. The dominant monkey who 
feeds first and thereby protects his genes in his kindred may indeed 
be leaving superior monkeys in subsequent generations. But a hu- 
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man who grabs food from a neighbor is not improving the human 
genome at all (contributing superior grabbing genes to the gene 
pool), because the human genome functions in culture, where there 
are sharing and general educability. The human who shares food 
with a neighbor, where this contributes to their mutual survival – 
should this behavior be genetically based and selected for – is im-
proving the human genome. This capacity for sharing behavior is 
essential in culture where things can be acquired during lifetimes, 
where values are transmitted nongenetically – knowledge, skills, re-
sources, language, traditions, ideas, scientific discoveries, ethical con-
victions, and religious beliefs. 
What happens in the monkey case and what happens in the hu-
man case are radically different conceptually. If humans have some 
elements of wild nature left in them genetically, these dispositions 
will frequently remain functional. When one gets hungry, one goes 
in search of food. But there may be other wild dispositions that hu-
mans have to rise above, if they are to rise into culture. Humans may 
fail to rise to their moral possibilities, fail to share, and lapse into 
sheer selfishness. Although self-defense is proper and valuable in 
animals, and proper and valuable also for persons, when self-defense 
passes over into selfishness, this is improper and disvaluable in cul-
ture. Then there will appear what the theologians call sin, and this 
historic and perennial lapsing has sometimes been called original sin. 
Religions deal with this tendency; they regenerate humans for suc-
cessful life in culture. 
Such sharing capacities do indeed produce human prosperity (fer-
tility), but tight connections to the genes – this behavior linked to this 
genetic coding – have been left behind in the exodus from nature to 
culture. Natural selection is relaxed. By the time one encounters the 
universal altruism taught in the world faiths, there is no genetic leash 
at all. Rather, religious values are, to recall words used earlier, being 
"distributed," "dispersed," "allocated," "proliferated," "divided," 
"multiplied," "recycled," "shared," deliberately and out of convic-
tion that this is good and right. And if some of these persons say that 
"God commands this altruism," that this kind of suffering love is 
divine, there seems no reason yet forthcoming from the biologists to 
think otherwise. To the contrary, this genesis of religion with its ca-
pacity to generate the generous altruism requisite for culture still 
needs adequate explanation. 
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4. FUNCTIONAL AND TRUE RELIGION 
Religion, then, must function to generate innovative ethical behavior, 
unknown otherwise in natural history, which makes possible the hu-
man genius (Geist), which cannot exist outside the social covenant. 
When this happens, the human genius is still more fertile. Reflective 
religion comes further to serve the function of explaining the creative 
genesis in both natural and cultural history, both describing and 
evaluating it. Such explanations have to work; they are the backing 
for the ethic. But we must press the further question of whether they 
also need to be true. Religion can generate ideologies that help per-
sons cope. Religion can generate altruism sufficient for cultural sur-
vival. Can religion generate truth? Is that too part of the human 
genius? 
For a pragmatist there is no further question, since whatever 
works is ipso facto true. Our question is more realist, about facts as 
well as functions. Since we believe that the genesis needing explana-
tion in both nature and culture is the actual fact of the matter, events 
that have taken place in history, we also seek an accurate explanation 
and evaluation. Is it also the fact of the matter, the way things are, to 
say that God is in, with, and under such genesis? We first look at 
some doubts, en route to a more positive conclusion. 
(1) Survival Value with and without Truth 
"Traditional religious beliefs have been eroded, not so much by hu-
miliating disproofs of their mythologies as by the growing awareness 
that beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival" (Wilson 
1978, p. 3). That is a rather strange disproof itself. 
1. If S (survival-enabling), then not T (true). 
2. S. 
3. Therefore not T. 
The logic is valid, but are the premises sound? Religious beliefs ena-
ble survival in the general sense of helping people manage over the 
generations, as no one wishes to deny, although we just also con-
cluded that religious universalism extensively overreaches the ge-
netic survival of particular practitioners. So the second premise is 
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half-true. Meanwhile the first premise is curious in its connecting of 
coping with untruth. 
If eyes enable humans to cope, then what they see is not true. 
If ears enable humans to cope, then what they hear is not true. 
If mathematics enables humans to cope, then what this calculates 
is not true. 
If medicine enables humans to cope, then medical theories are 
not true. 
If science enables humans to cope, then science is not true. 
If ethics enables humans to cope, then ethics is not true. 
If religion enables humans to cope, then religion is not true. 
The presumption, usually, is that survival-enabling mechanisms 
track something there in the world – eyes seeing a predator, ears 
hearing a friend, mathematics balancing income and expenditures, 
science making a medicine that kills germs, ethics distributing re-
sources fairly. This presumption has to be overridden in religion. 
Anomalously, religion is a coping myth. 
Neither perception nor conception is infallible; both are often true 
at a native range from which one cannot extrapolate too far. The eyes 
see what is there (trees, tigers, houses), but also what is not there 
(the flat earth, setting sun, green trees, blue sky); sometimes a super-
ficial correctness is at depth illusory. Appearance is not reality. Even 
science, as philosophers constantly warn nowadays, is pragmatic and 
not ultimately descriptive, not descriptive of anything ultimate. Hu-
mans frequently know how to manipulate things with little knowl-
edge of what is really going on, as when people bake bread with no 
idea of the chemistry involved. 
Still it is hard to see how science makes medicines that kill germs 
unless the germs are there and the drug in fact is toxic to them. Some 
scientists do know the bread chemistries. Humans know about many 
events rather far removed from our native range – astronomical ones, 
such as a round Earth orbiting a sun, or supernovae, and microscopic 
ones, such as DNA coding and covalent bonding. Such knowledge 
partly is and partly is not survival-enabling; it partly retains and 
partly modifies native-range impressions that are survival-enabling. 
So, although it does not demean a science to realize that it has sur-
vival value, the relation between truth and survival value is; not 
straightforward even there. 
It is reasonable to begin with the assumption that acting on true 
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beliefs will bring success. If I believe rightly that there are deer in the 
valley and go there to hunt them, I may well succeed. If I believe 
wrongly, I will fail. Even on the pragmatic theory, survival selects 
for native-range truth. Scientists need descriptive truth when they go 
after the world, just as much as hunters who go after deer. There is 
no cause to expect that whatever meets the needs of practice is going 
to be theoretically wrong. 
Ruse thinks that even mathematics just conveys survival advan-
tage. "The human who believes that '2 + 2' really equals '4' is going 
to act upon it without question, as are his/her fellows. And this will 
give them a selective advantage over those who question the basic 
premises of logic and mathematics, sometimes disobeying them." 
This is the way it is, but it might have been otherwise. "Selection 
cares only about keeping us alive and our passing on of our genes. 
. . . Thus, if we benefit biologically by being deluded about the true 
nature of formal thought, so be it" (1986, p. 172). But can we imagine 
that humans who randomize for the outcome of 2 + 2 might have 
been selected for? Or that those prosper who, in the interest of eq-
uity, rotate the outcome through 1 to 10 on successive days? Hardly, 
because these procedures are logically wrong, and therefore they will 
fail in empirical application. It is implausible that life should have 
evolved a bad computational logic that is a good adaptive fit. A 
theoretically mistaken mathematics might meet the needs of practice, 
if it nevertheless provided good approximations, but not if the for-
mal mistake really misinformed the practice. 
Those who cope well need a worldview that represents rather 
reliably what the world is like, at least those sectors of it through 
which they have to move. There cannot be too much gap between 
appearance and reality. That works with sense perception, with sci-
ence, even in ethics at everyday empirical ranges. People use religion 
too to operate at everyday empirical ranges. Nevertheless in religion 
a problem arises because a modern person, whether monotheist be-
liever or secular scientist, will soon enough encounter beliefs that 
seem to enable persons to function reasonably well that bear no re-
semblance to world facts. Even believers in the monotheist God of 
Judaism and Christianity have a lot to explain away in the enormous 
variety of "pagan" beliefs and practices. Shinto believers held that 
the emperor was descended from the sun goddess; an Australian 
Aranda may think he is descended from the kangaroos. Divinely 
descended leaders and totemism may inform practice successfully, 
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but both are misinformed theoretically. How can it be that in reli-
gion, unlike mathematics, misinformation forms successful practice? 
Darwin found himself beset by "the horrid doubt" whether the 
convictions of a man's mind are any more trustworthy than those of 
a monkey's mind (Chapter 4, Sec. 7). But there is every reason to 
trust a monkey's mind about whether raptors, snakes, or tigers are 
present. There is every reason to trust any creature's mind in the 
niche in which it is adapted to survive. The human niche is culture 
as well as nature. When one finds that human minds are disposed to 
beliefs of both conscience and religion, what then? We are first in-
clined to trust such minds and then startled to find them full of ideas 
that seem incredible. How can this happen? 
C. S. Peirce claims: 
Logicality in regard to practical matters. . . is the most useful 
quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result from 
the action of natural selection; but outside of these it is probably 
of more advantage to the animal to have his mind filled with 
pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; 
and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might oc-
casion a fallacious tendency of thought. (1960, vol. 5, sec. 366) 
Lionel Tiger adds: "Optimism has been central to the process of 
human evolution. . . .Making optimistic symbols and anticipating 
optimistic outcomes is as much a part of human nature, of the hu-
man biology, as are the shape of the body, the growth of children, 
and the zest of sexual pleasure" (1979, p. 15; cf. Taylor 1989). Arnold 
Ludwig agrees: "Fantasy, then, often represents a convenient way 
for man to temporarily lie to himself in order to make life more 
palatable" (1965, pp. 179). 
Now the logic is different: 
If a practical matter, then thought must be accurate (true). 
If an impractical matter, then thought must be pleasant (not 
true). 
The animal knows the truth when it is vital; the animal feels good 
when it isn't important; this combination is better for survival than 
truth all around. It is as though the animal operates in the real world 
by day and has pleasant dreams at night, which relax it for work 
again the next day. 
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If a scientific matter, then thought must be accurate (true). 
If a religious matter, then thought must be pleasant (not true). 
A problem with this account is that any religion so explained has 
to be impractical, and there is no evidence that religion is unimpor-
tant or irrelevant in the lives of these myriad believers. To the con- 
trary, their life practices are oriented by religion. Almost by defini-
tion, religion is what one is "bound to" (Greek: re-ligio, redoubled 
binding). The biologists have been insisting that religion has survival 
value just because it congeals group loyalty, demands short-term 
sacrifices in the interests of long-term benefits, offsets biological 
self-interest to develop the more altruistic virtues necessary for 
culture, results in more offspring in the next generation, and so on. 
If Cinderella thinks about mice in the pantry, she must be accurate. 
If Cinderella thinks about Prince Charming, she must be pleased. 
Religion is a Cinderella story that helps girls function when scrub-
bing the floors, it fulfills Cinderella's psychological "needs," but it is 
really out of touch with reality. Here she needs a pleasant appear-
ance that veils her harsh reality. 
So, to project the Cinderella parable into metaphysics, the world 
is really harsh and meaningless, but we humans invent religions to 
save us from the truth, rather than to help us discover the real truth. 
Here people need to get it wrong. Religiously, we need an illusion in 
order to keep our spirits up, though practically, we must have cor-
respondence between appearance and reality in order to operate suc-
cessfully (Rue 1994). Practically, Cinderella needs a science to tell it 
like it is; mythically, she needs a religion to tell it like it isn't. 
If that is true, science is bad news, eroding these traditional my-
thologies, as Wilson thinks it does. Science is disabling these enabling 
mechanisms, and how can humans then survive, so disabled? So 
science, which we have earlier found to be quite enabling for sur-
vival, is now discovered to be only penultimately so, and ultimately 
disabling. Fortunately, or unfortunately (?), scientists, who get it 
right, are likely to be disabled most, and those who continue the 
traditional mythologies, and get it wrong, will outreproduce them! 
Meanwhile, Peirce's account fails to reckon with how religion has 
to be functional in society corporately, not just provide a relaxing 
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dream for individuals at night or on Sundays when there is no work. 
Cinderella has to relate to her stepmother and sisters religiously and 
thereby to manage in her real world, not just the imaginary one of 
her dreams. That is where her real, social need fulfillment must take 
place. Prince Charmings come rarely or never. Religion cannot be 
just episodic retreats from reality. Religion too has to keep her in 
contact with reality; she must return to the operating world and 
work there practically. Humans do have to get some values right, if 
they are to succeed, and young girls who wait around for handsome 
princes to rescue them have few actual needs fulfilled and even 
fewer offspring. Fantasy is seldom functional. People who are wrong 
about causal connections (bad science) will fail, but people who are 
wrong about what is valuable in the world (bad religion) will just as 
surely fail. 
Religions do need to distinguish between ideal and real (which is 
not the same as appearance and reality). Often persons need an ideal 
toward which they reshape the real. It can certainly be adaptive to 
have ideals to which one aspires, even if one falls short. All of us are 
like that, in our better moments. That is what makes us better. Reli-
gion and ethics both prescribe what ought to be even when it isn't, 
as well as describe what is. The question turns around what these 
ideals are. If the sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists are 
right, the ideals, sooner or later, tacitly if not explicitly, are the most 
offspring in the next generation. But we have been recognizing vari-
ous other ideals ("myths") – universal love, evangelism, redemption, 
self-actualizing, justice, fairness, honesty – that seem maladaptive for 
maximizing offspring. Perhaps Cinderella thought her rights were 
being violated. If she could assert her rights, she would probably 
have more offspring, and religion might support human rights. 
Humans absolutely must get their social functioning act together. 
A religion has to have enough realism about the human condition, 
real and ideal; about the values that motivate persons to behave in 
interpersonal relationships; about parenting responsibilities; and so 
forth, to get a whole society from one generation to the next, and the 
next, across generations. There is nothing impractical about that. 
Fairy tales, like fables, embody occasional bits of wisdom, but can 
you operate a whole society on fairy tales and other pleasant fanta-
sies? What one really needs to examine is the relationship between 




(2) Testing Religions Socially 
This is not a problem first conjured up by the biologists; the sociolo-
gists have been troubled by it for years – although not in the genetic 
form. Religions have regularly claimed that they were good for the 
well-being of society. Finding such a connection is, ipso facto, no 
cause to cease to behave religiously. To the contrary, it is an excellent 
reason to continue observance. One's reasons for observance might 
be weakened, though, if it were shown that observance is "nothing 
but" behavior for the good of society, that is, that there is no further 
reason to think that any of these beliefs is true. 
Those reasons will have to come from some other dimension of 
human experience and will force asking whether functioning is a test 
for truth in religion. Can there be functional religions that are not 
true? Can there be true religions that are not functional? What is one 
to make of the error in religion? To be wrong in religion seems to 
mean more than just not functional. For it is certainly true that reli-
gion has been (and often continues to be) filled with beliefs that no 
scientifically minded person can seriously entertain to be true, and 
that these beliefs are sometimes more or less functional. 
What separates out religion as anomalous, is the feeling, by mod-
ern persons, that the religions just cannot all be true – they are too 
diverse, conflicting, and fantastic – so one must look for some other 
account of them, which preserves their functionality without requir-
ing their truth. Humans with their eyes and ears, humans with their 
mathematics and sciences, reach much consensus on what is true, 
but in philosophy, in ethics, and especially in religion, they do not. 
Wilson cites with approval Anthony F. C. Wallace's estimate that 
humans have produced 100,000 religions (Wallace 1966, p. 3; Wilson 
1978, p. 169). If there are that many they all must really be the same 
thing, some essence beneath the fluff; the explicit cognitive claims 
cannot be right; there must be a tacit, functional explanation. Like a 
kaleidoscope that produces 100,000 patterns with a simple mirror 
arrangement reflecting the contingent falls of bits of glass, there is 
really only one mechanism driving religion, and the particulars are 
frills on the universal. 
Animals that misperceive their environments do not survive; an 
adapted fit cannot be based on false information about the world. 
But with animals there is no problem with conflicting worldviews: 
the deer are unanimous about whether that is an approaching pan- 
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ther, whether it is dangerous, and which direction it is coming from. 
Even humans are unanimous about such empirical facts. But humans 
differ widely in their worldviews, and they cannot all be right about 
these. "The enduring paradox of religion is that so much of its sub-
stance is demonstrably false, yet it remains a driving force in all 
societies. Men would rather believe than know." It is hard to believe 
that "such force could really be extracted from 'a tissue of illusions'" 
(Wilson, 1975a, p. 561). The solution is that religion, though a tissue 
of illusions cognitively, is a strange kind of error that evolution pro-
motes, since the outcome of religion that is visible to natural selection 
is its survival value, and natural selection selects for that, regardless 
of truth. 
Can evolution promote error? Usually no, but sometimes yes. 
There can be myths that insulate, pacify, sedate, or unify; stimulate, 
inspire, or engender other useful behaviors. The anomaly is that such 
a fantastic point of view results in an adequate response to the envi-
ronment. It is as though humans live in a bad world – one where 
they must all compete with each other genetically and for resources, 
where nature is red in tooth and claw, where they must band to-
gether selfishly yet also cooperatively in culture, where they will all 
eventually lose. Paradoxically, this world is so bad that only the op-
timistic will survive. Usually, you can function well only if you know 
the truth about your world, but here you can only function well if 
you do not. So one must be deceived to succeed. This becomes a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. Those who believe the gods are on their side 
make it through. The realists, if there are any, go extinct. If this is 
true, then one might ask whether we want to know otherwise. These 
biologists will not be bringing us a truth that sets humans free, but a 
truth that triggers our extinction. 
This is such an anomaly that one will want to examine the para-
digm that is framing it. Perhaps this anomaly is only an artifact of a 
particular theory. Such a picture comes from selfish genes, random 
variation, blind selection, evolutionary history as a random walk, 
survival of the fittest, and so forth. But there is the alternative ac-
count: of widely distributed and conserved (shared) values both in 
nature and in culture. There are dimensions of struggle, suffering, 
and tragedy in this picture too, but there are genesis and creativity, 
generation and regeneration. Accompanying a human exodus from 
nature into culture, some religious persons discover, over time, the 
virtues of cooperation and altruism that make culture possible (more 
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sharing). Some of them detect the divine in their midst endorsing 
such virtue. From this perspective we have not really been given any 
reason to think that those who make these sorts of claims in religion, 
though survival-enabling, are not right because they have too rosy 
an account of the bleak world. Whatever account one may have to 
give of the many myths in religion, in this part of it, about the divine 
will in, with, and under the socially functional and universal altru-
ism, we are getting a dash of philosophical views. These views are 
being superimposed on the facts; indeed people are seeing differing 
facts as a result of differing interpretive gestalts. 
We need a better account of whether there is sometimes cognitive 
truth in religion, and, if there is, whether such truth might not be 
quite compatible with survival value. Then one might be in a posi-
tion better to understand why and how such believers not only make 
it through but evangelize others. 
(3) Testing Religions Cognitively 
Are all the 100,000 religions just turns on a socially functional kalei-
doscope, with the differences between them insignificant? That 
might be true of many religions, but there is something more to be 
said. The religions that have spread worldwide, that persist and de-
velop over the centuries, are quite few: about ten religions form the 
chapters in a typical world religions textbook. So all are not equally 
socially functional on a world scale; less than a dozen were exported 
outside their originating tribes to become global faiths. What account 
is one to give of the few that were? 
We are confronting universalism again, now in religion as well as 
in ethics, and wondering whether the universalism in the ten survi-
vors is just more covert social functioning promoting covert genetic 
survival, from which one must dismiss any cognitive content as ir-
relevant fluff. Perhaps this long-continuing, ever-widening social 
functioning is linked to some insightful cognitive content, especially 
where the classical religions are so anomalously transtribal and 
transgenetic. 
An alternative account, recalling the "generate and test" model, 
holds that the 100,000:10 selection effect has been a trial-and-error 
learning process. The creeds (theories) that remain have survived 
because they have a good deal of corroboration and have not yet 
been falsified. They have a staying power in the face of arguments 
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and evidence. Analogously, humans have produced 100,000 theories 
in science, of which, again, perhaps 10 are leading survivors (relativ-
ity theory, quantum theory, atomic theory, the chemical periodic ta-
ble, the geological epochs and cycles, plate tectonics, evolutionary 
theory). There is a consensus on such scientific theories not yet 
reached by the remaining, often competing religions. Nevertheless, 
the winnowing of religions is a testing by which some survive and 
others do not. Mostly, there are chaff, dross, noise, but sometimes 
there are grain, gold, information. 
Along the diverse routes of religious development, humans will 
often have constructed beliefs that are functional in some local and 
limited context, though they are not true. Sometimes erroneous sci-
entific theories stayed around quite a while (fixity of species, spon-
taneous generation of life, phlogiston), but eventually better ones 
supplanted them. The better adapted survived – that is, the better 
ones with which to adapt survived – and we also believe that the 
prevailing theories are more approximately true. The history of as-
tronomy is beset with astrology, the history of mathematics is beset 
with curious numerology, and it will not discredit all religion to find 
such things as demonology, angelology, and superstition in some of 
it. One can employ a developmental, trial-and-error, generate-and- 
test account of religion too. Often these trials will work briefly, or in 
elementary circumstances. But they will not survive the cross-critical 
sifting that the world religions do manage to survive. 
The process is generate and test again, but this time it is also 
regenerate and test. What is tested now is not genes, not just hypoth-
eses, but persons who embody creeds, who may be "saved" as those 
creeds inform appropriate behavior for managing in the world. One 
does not want to dismiss the survival-enabling component, but to 
search for an appropriate lived experience that lives successfully in 
the world because it detects the bigger forces operating there, as a 
compass detects invisible global forces. The fantasies will be selected 
out in critical insight into what really orients in the world, and these 
tested (and true) insights will cumulate over the millennia of the 
religious heritages. Once again, natural selection is relaxed, this time 
in favor of religious selection. Believers, like ethicists and scientists, 
must have offspring, but believers have to have disciples, whether 
their children or proselytes, whom they can persuade to adopt the 
style of life their religion commends. 
Some religious claims that are functional will perhaps remain long 
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in place because these conserve what some local society values, un- 
contested by any rival claims. As long as such a claim stays isolated, 
it can be retaught over generations; perhaps no indigenous believer 
has the imagination to challenge it. Natural selection in wild nature 
often leaves locally endemic species in odd niches, surviving more 
by isolation than by competitive success. 
But when such once-isolated claims do face challenges, in the con-
flict with missionary arrivals, or in the dialogue of world faiths, or in 
the effort to proselytize others with differing faiths, or in the encoun-
ter with science, the functional test is no longer good enough. The 
naive religious claim must meet skeptics, resist invasion, invade the 
status quo, displace vested interests, win debates, regenerate sinners, 
as well as make better parents. The claim must have rational defen- 
sibility proportionate to relevant evidence; it must deploy to cover 
an expanding set of evidence. That has been the core problem with 
the myriad nonexportable indigenous faiths. None of their theses 
could survive the onslaughts of ecumenical criticism. Thus Shinto 
never left Japan, nor could it; and the Australian Aranda who thinks 
himself descended from the kangaroos has convinced no one outside 
tribal Australia. Those beliefs vanish in the modern world because 
they cannot make converts. 
Only the universalist, synoptic creeds have proved exportable, 
globally functional, because they speak to the common condition of 
humankind, a necessary condition of success. They do not simply 
offer fertility, nor even doing well in life, if this means survival. They 
offer persons the promise that they can understand the fundamental 
structure of reality (what is) and tap powers here for the redemption 
of life in its brokenness (what ought to be). They invite critical 
self-assessment and reformation; they promise enlightenment and 
freedom. And they are tested against each other in the fulfillment 
of these promises. Of the functional faiths, only those with the 
theses that are the most defensible rationally, as well as the most 
operational experientially, and those that give life the most meaning, 
are competent to survive. 
Kitcher concludes: 
Just as a detailed history of arithmetical concepts and counting 
practices might show us a succession of myths and errors, yet 
would not lead us to question the objectivity of the arithmetical 
statements we now accept, so too reconstructions of the historical 
development of ethical ideas and practices do not preclude the 
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possibility that we have now achieved a justified system of moral 
precepts. Wilson is far too hasty in assuming that the evolution-
ary scenario he gives for the emergence of religious ideas – a 
scenario that stresses the adaptive advantages of religious beliefs 
and practices – undercuts the doctrine that religious statements 
are true. Even if Wilson's scenario were correct, the devout could 
reasonably reply that, like our arithmetical ideas and practices, 
our religious claims have become more accurate as we have 
learned more about the world. (1985, p. 419) 
Wilson mentions religious systems of morality only to dismiss 
them; his reason is spurious. "If religion... can be systematically 
analyzed and explained as a product of the brain's evolution, its 
power as an external source of morality will be gone forever." 
The argument turns on a critical ambiguity. If religious concepts 
are nothing but products of our brains, then, of course, religion 
is just a story. If, however, the history of religious belief shows 
human beings gaining knowledge of entities that actually exist, 
then there are no grounds for Wilson's conclusion. . . . There is 
no quick argument for debunking religion (or mathematics) on 
the grounds that it has a checkered history. (1985, p. 424) 
Every set of human ideas – science, ethics, religion, or whatever – 
has a history that connects with the brain that has evolved, that has 
been used for building a culture and getting along in the world, but 
what one wants to know is whether some of these ideas, gained with 
this evolved brain, are true and correct and others false and incorrect. 
The basic theoretical model is variation, selection, and retention. 
Biology uses one version, naturalized in genetics. Religion, as does 
science, uses a socialized version that goes beyond genetics. Not only 
is all religion culturally transmitted, but some is transmitted by uni-
versal proselytizing, urging universal altruism. The first round of 
selection is pragmatic, socially functional survival value, but the sec-
ond round of selection is critical and cognitive. Both rounds are eval-
uative, testing a religion for what it is worth. The only ones that are 
able to survive and flourish over the millennia are the universal ones, 
able to win by proselytizing and universal altruism. That does not 
sound like selfish genes. It sounds like truths that have got loose 
transgenetically and are being shared around the world, that is, in the 
religious imagery, truth that is "blessing" all nations. 
We first think that function is underdetermining truth, but the 
truth may rather be that progressively powerful functioning is cor-
roborating truth. There is nothing particularly biological about a cull- 
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ing process that generates and tests variations on religion, any more 
than there is about a similar systematic methodology in science or 
ethics. Indeed it seems countergenetic when a principal criterion for 
a religion's survival is a universal scope that discredits the tribal 
religions that have been unable to generate exportable, globally true 
theses. 
5. GENESIS AND GOD 
There is a metaphysical version of the if-functional-then-not-true ar-
gument. Wilson argues that if something has evolved in natural his-
tory, then it cannot be the work of transcendent deity. 
1. If E (evolved), then not T (transcendent). 
2. E. 
3. Therefore not T. 
"No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the impera- 
tives created by its genetic history. . . .We have no particular place 
to go. The species lacks any goal external to its own biological na-
ture" (1978, pp. 2-3).  "There is no transcendental guide or extra- 
somic set of universal principles to follow" (Wilson 1980a, p. 70). As 
before, the logic is valid, but are the premises sound? "If x emerged 
in historical time, then x is not divine"? If from genes, then not from 
God? 
That fails to consider whether one purpose of God might be this 
Earth history: the creation and its redemption. This amounts to 
claiming, in the traditional vocabulary of theologians, that imma-
nence cannot combine with transcendence, that the beyond cannot 
be in our midst. Theologians almost unanimously think otherwise, 
on the evidence of religious experience, critically evaluated. So one 
will need to know what it is about biology, about genetics, that au-
thorizes this conclusion that the historical cannot be the immanent 
location of a transcendent divine presence. We humans do not partic-
ularly want some goal "external to our biological nature"; we wish 
one consistent with it, but we might want to maintain that, meta-
physically, neither our biological nor our sociological natures are 
self-explanatory. 
Wilson insists, "The evolutionary epic is probably the best myth 
we will ever have" (1978, p. 201). We agree, but the question is 
whether the dramatic events on this Earth contain no hint of larger, 
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more universal powers in which they are embedded. Perhaps, rather, 
culture and biology are finding out in their historical domains what 
Kurt Gödel found for the much simpler domains of mathematics and 
logic, that systems to be completely understood require reference to 
other systems at a higher level of organization. Against the reduc-
tionists, religious persons have to be compositionists, to move up, 
not down, to get the interpretive level needed to frame and complete 
lower level truths. Nature and history have been creative, making 
more out of less. The essential characteristic of narrative is that 
events have to be understood in the light of the complexities to 
which they lead, not just in the light of the origins from which they 
flow. The event structures toward which things climb, their endings, 
are as significant as the matter-energy out of which they arise, their 
beginnings. 
We have no cause to think that the startling genesis on Earth, 
recorded in the genes, recorded in the cultural heritages, including 
the religions, is not sacred; nor that humans, funded by their evolved 
perceptual and cognitive equipment, can never detect that sacred 
presence. The idea of God has been among the most fertile in shaping 
history. That is the fertility that ultimately needs to be explained. 
That returns us to the global claims of religion, claims that are 
transcendent at least in the sense of detecting a divine power in, 
with, and under the genesis on Earth. Contra Wilson, does biology 
leave space for such claims or even invite such claims as comple-
mentary explanations? Genes record only a portion of the history 
that has taken place: they do not, for instance, record the prelife cos- 
mological story; nor do they record the postgenetic cultural story. 
Still, vital to the Earth epic is this fertility intimately linked with the 
genes, the means by which all the more complex structures on 
Earth, living things, are formed. There are no such genes on the 
moon, nor Jupiter, nor Mars. Genes remember, research, and recom- 
pound discoveries, and the storied achievements, the values 
achieved, rise, over several billion years, to spectacular levels of at-
tainment and power. The cosmic universals give way to the particu-
lars of Earthen natural history. 
(1) Actual and Possible Natural History 
What can we say about how the possible becomes actual over evo-
lutionary time? Here, one must increasingly pass from bioscience to 
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metaphysics. We return, at the end, to questions faced earlier, about 
the increase of complexity and diversity, about contingency and in-
evitability in such increase, about progress, now with questions 
looming about the possibility of divine presence. This is the fertility 
question in its metaphysical form, the generation of the actual out of 
the possible, and the generation of those possibilities, and even a 
Generator of such possibilities. The possibility route to be found is 
not so much logical, or empirical, or even physical; it is historical. 
What possibility spaces are needed to get from beginnings to where 
we have now arrived, in Earth history? 
At the other extreme from those emphasizing the contingency, 
there are eminent biologists – though they tend to be molecular bi-
ologists rather than paleontologists – who find this storied natural 
history to be inevitable, at least in outline, and therefore predictable. 
Christian de Duve concludes: "Life was bound to arise under the 
prevailing conditions, and it will arise similarly wherever and when-
ever the same conditions obtain. There is hardly any room for 'lucky 
accidents' in the gradual, multistep process whereby life originated." 
After life arises there is contingency as to its directions and species, 
but this is "constrained contingency" so that the general trends in 
the development of life – cellular organisms, multicellular organisms, 
solar energized organisms, increasingly diverse and complex organ-
isms, and intelligent organisms – are likewise inevitable. "Life and 
mind emerge not as the results of freakish accidents, but as natural 
manifestations of matter, written into the fabric of the universe. I 
view this universe [as] . . . made in such a way as to generate life and 
mind, bound to give birth to thinking beings'' (1995, pp. xv-xvi and 
xviii). 
"This universe breeds life inevitably," concludes George Wald 
(1974, p. 9). Life is an accident waiting to happen, because it is blue-
printed into the chemicals, rather as sodium and chlorine are preset 
to form salt, only much more startlingly so because of the rich impli-
cations for life and because of the openness and information transfer 
also present in the historical life process. Whatever place dice throw-
ing has in its appearance and maturation, life is something arranged 
for in the nature of things. The dice are loaded. 
When the predecessors of DNA and RNA appear, enormously 
complex molecules appear; bearing the possibility of genetic coding 
and information, they are conserved, writes Melvin Calvin, "not by 
accident but because of the peculiar chemistries of the various bases 
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and amino acids. . . . There is a kind of selectivity intrinsic in the 
structures." The evolution of life, so far from being random, is "a 
logical consequence" of natural chemistries (1975, pp. 176 and 169). 
Manfred Eigen concludes that "the evolution of life . . . must be con- 
sidered an inevitable process despite its indeterminate course" (1971, 
p. 519; 1992). Life is destined to come as part of the narrative story, 
although the exact routes it will take are open and subject to histori-
cal vicissitudes. Kauffman agrees: "I believe that the origin of life 
was not an enormously improbable event, but law-like and governed 
by new principles of self-organization in complex webs of catalysts" 
(1993, p. xvi; 1995). 
Such accounts suggest that the possibilities are always there, latent 
in the physics and chemistry, although the resulting Earth history is 
not so "fine-tuned" as astrophysics and nuclear physics have found 
in their cosmologies. But even in Earthen biology, the possibilities 
must, or almost must, become actual. Alternately put, there are few 
possibilities beyond those that do actualize. But of course all such 
possibilities are seen only retrospectively. What does happen, can 
happen. But we are wondering how it comes about that these events 
can happen. If, per impossibile, some scientist had under observation 
the elementary particles forming after the first three minutes, nothing 
much in them suggests anything specific about the coding for life 
that would take place, fifteen billion years later, on Earth. After Earth 
forms, the lifeless planet is irradiated by solar energy, as are other 
planets as well. The events in physics and chemistry there are to a 
considerable extent lawlike and predictable, at least statistically, al-
though in geology and meteorology the system is quite complex as a 
result of shifting initial conditions, possibly even at times chaotic. 
Still, in orogeny and erosion, or the shifting of the tectonic plates, the 
possibilities always seem there. 
At the microscopic levels, quantum physics depicts an open sys-
tem and nested sets of possibilities, but, at first, all the atoms and 
molecules take nonliving tracks. Only later do some atoms and mol-
ecules begin to take living tracks, called forth as interaction phenom-
ena when cybernetic organisms appear. If there is some "inside or-
der" to matter that makes it prolife, it is in the whole system and not 
just in the particles. Despite the anthropic principle, such order is not 
generally evident in the systemic astronomy, since by far the vastest 
parts of the universe are lifeless. Life is an Earth-bound probability. 
Nor, on Earth, are the meteorological or geomorphological systems 
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all that suggestive of inevitable life. They mostly seem kaleidoscopic 
variations on geophysical and geochemical processes. 
Only in biology do there open up entirely unprecedented levels of 
achievement and power. Such possibilities are not inside the atoms 
and molecules apart from their systemic location, since atoms and 
molecules would not even be collected into a "thin hot soup" except 
for the Earth world in which this is possible, nor can this or that 
sequence of DNA code for anything unless there is an environment 
in which to behave this way or that, with a niche to fill. Even if there 
is some "selectivity intrinsic in the structures/' this does not rule out 
a universe of myriad options, only some of which are realized. 
Physics and chemistry, unaided, do not get us very near to life 
and mind. There really isn't much in the physics and chemistry of 
atoms and molecules, prior to their biological assembling, that sug-
gests that they have any tendencies to order themselves up to life. 
Even after things have developed as far as the building blocks of life, 
there is nothing in a "thin hot soup" of disconnected amino acids to 
predict that they will connect themselves or be selected along up-
ward, negentropic though metastable courses into proteins, nor that 
they will arrange for DNA molecules in which to record the various 
discoveries of structures and metabolisms specific to the diverse 
forms of life. 
All these events may occur naturally, but they are still quite a 
surprise. Recent microbiology has been revealing their enormous 
complexity. We do not know that life, if it occurs on some other 
planet, there built too of the same atoms, must select these same 
biochemistries, although the amino acids found on meteorites and 
the prebiotic molecules guessed to be present in interstellar dust 
clouds can suggest that the potential for life is omnipresent in matter. 
Laws are important in natural systems, whether extraterrestrial or 
terrestrial. But natural law is not the complete explanatory category 
for nature, any more than are randomness and chance. In nature, 
especially on this historical Earth, there is creativity by which more 
comes out of less. 
Science does not handle historical explanations very competently, 
especially where there are emergent novelties; science prefers lawlike 
explanations in which there are no surprises. One predicts, and the 
prediction comes true. If such precision is impossible, science prefers 
statistical predictions, probabilities. One predicts, and, probably, the 
prediction comes true. Biology, meanwhile, though prediction is of- 
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ten possible, is also full of unpredictable surprises – like calcium 
endoskeletons in vertebrates after millennia of diatomaceous silica 
and chitinous arthropod exoskeletons. A main turning point in the 
history of life fused once-independent organisms into the cell and its 
mitochondria, which became the powerhouses for life. Another criti-
cal symbiosis introduced free-living chloroplasts into the plant cell, 
again producing the energy vital for all life. 
There is no induction (expecting the future to be like the past) by 
which one can expect, even probably, trilobites later from prokary- 
otes earlier, or dinosaurs still later by extrapolating along a regres-
sion line (a progression line!) drawn from prokaryotes to trilobites. 
There are no humans invisibly present (as an acorn secretly contains 
an oak) in the primitive eukaryotes, to unfold in a lawlike or pro-
grammatic way. The ancient ancestral forms are not protovertebrates 
or preterrestrials, nor are gymnosperms about-to-be angiosperms, as 
though the descendant forms were latent among the functions of the 
predecessors. Originating events often become what they become 
only retrospectively: "Vertebrates began (possibly) with the noto- 
chords of primitive chordates." "Eyes began with . . . " Nevertheless, 
there is the epic story – eukaryotes, trilobites, dinosaurs, primates – 
swarms of wild creatures in seas and on land, followed by humans 
who arrive late in the story. 
Making this survey, can one insist that the probabilities, or at least 
the possibilities, must always have been there? Can one claim that 
what did actually manage to happen must always have been either 
probably probable, or, minimally, improbably possible all along the 
way? Push this to extremes, as one must do, if one claims that all the 
possibilities are always there, latent in the dust, latent in the quarks. 
Such a claim becomes pretty much an act of speculative faith, not in 
present actualities, since one knows that these events took place, but 
in past probabilities always being omnipresent. Is the claim some 
kind of induction or deduction, or most-plausible-case conclusion 
from present actualities? Speculation about such possibilities that are 
always there is easy, provided one does not have to specify any of 
the details. But this perennial and vast library of possibilities is 
mostly imaginary. 
For in fact, on Earth, there really isn't anything in rocks that sug-
gests the possibility of Homo sapiens, much less the American Civil 
War, or the World Wide Web, and to say that all these possibilities 
are lurking there, even though nothing we know about rocks, or 
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carbon atoms, or electrons and protons suggests this is simply to let 
possibilities float in from nowhere.2 Unbounded possibilities that one 
posits ad hoc to whatever one finds has in fact taken place – possi-
bilities of any kind and amount desired in one's metaphysical enthu-
siasm – can hardly be said to be a scientific hypothesis. This is hardly 
even a faith claim with sufficient warrant. It is certainly equally cred-
ible, and more plausible, and no less scientific to hold that new pos-
sibility spaces open up en route. 
Karl Popper concludes that science discovers "a world of propen-
sities," open to historical innovation, the possibility space ever en-
larging. 
In our real changing world, the situation and, with it, the possi- 
bilities, and thus the propensities, change all the time. . . . This 
view of propensities allows us to see in a new light the processes 
that constitute our world: the world process. The world is no 
longer a causal machine – it can now be seen as a world of 
propensities, as an unfolding process of realizing possibilities 
and of unfolding new possibilities. . . . New possibilities are cre- 
ated, possibilities that previously simply did not exist. . . . Espe- 
cially in the evolution of biochemistry, it is widely appreciated 
that every new compound creates new possibilities for further 
new compounds to synthesize: possibilities which previously did 
not exist. The possibility space... . is growing. . . . Our world of 
propensities is inherently creative. (1990, pp. 17-20) 
The result is the evolutionary drama. "The variety of those [organ-
isms] that have realized themselves is staggering." "In the end, we 
ourselves become possible" (1990, p. 26, p. 19). 
But – the reply comes – since all those things did come in subse-
quent evolutionary and cultural history, their possibilities must have 
been there all along. You were not listening when we discovered that 
matter is self-organizing, autopoietic. That posits enormous possibil-
ities, there from the start, and nothing in the historical drama ought 
to take by all that much surprise one who believes in self-organizing 
nature. Thomas R. Cech, a molecular biologist, reviews the origin of 
life: 
If intrinsic to these small organic molecules is their propensity to 
self-assemble, leading to a series of events that cause life forms 
2 Against the caution of Alfred North Whitehead (1929, p. 46). 
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to originate, that is perhaps the highest form of creation that one 
could imagine. . . . At least from the perspective of a biologist, I 
have given an account of how possibilities did, in times past 
become actual. When this happened, life originated with impres-
sive creativity, and it does not seem to me that possibilities 
floated in from nowhere; they were already present, intrinsic to 
the chemical materials. (1995, p. 33) 
True, matter – energized as it is on Earth – is now self-organizing. 
But that leaves open the question whether, on the adaptive land-
scapes on which organisms struggle to increase their fitness for sur-
vival, landscapes which themselves shift as the organisms make their 
discoveries, there are changing possibility spaces coming in through 
evolutionary history. In creating themselves, the creatures need pos-
sibility space, opportunity space, transformational space. Evolving 
into Homo sapiens is, we can suppose, in the possibility space of Homo 
habilis (or whatever the hypothetical ancestor). But it takes consider-
able imagination to find Homo in the possibility space of trilobites (or 
whatever the remote ancestor in that epoch). The creatures do have, 
over time, the possibility of speciating and respeciating. But it is not 
so clear that the creatures, in their self-actualizing, do have, or gen-
erate all by themselves, all these other kinds of selves into which 
they are transformed. There is enormously more out of less, and 
enormous space for the introduction of novelties that do not seem 
"up to" the faculties of the organism. One can say, if one likes, that 
a dinosaur is lurking in the possibility space of a microbe, or that 
microbes self-transform into dinosaurs, which self-transform into pri-
mates. But that really is not a claim based on anything we know 
about the biology or ontology of microbes. 
The self-creating is more a holistic, systemic affair; it is what hap-
pens to microbes when they are challenged in their habitats and after 
a very long time. This requires the creation of new possibility spaces. 
From a God's-eye view, perhaps the possibilities are always there,3 
but we humans have no such viewpoint. We do view results and 
know that the possibilities both got there and got actualized, but it is 
quite as much an act of faith to see dinosaurs in the possibility spaces 
of quarks as to see dinosaurs in the possibility space of God. 
3 "My frame was not hidden from thee, when I was being made in secret, intri-
cately wrought in the depths of the earth. Thy eyes beheld my unformed sub-
stance" (Psalm 139.15-16). 
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Looking at a pool of amino acids and seeing dinosaurs or Homo 
sapiens in them is something like looking at a pile of alphabetical 
letters and seeing Hamlet. In fact Hamlet is not lurking around a pile 
of A - Z's; such a play is not within their possibility space – not until 
Shakespeare comes around, and in Shakespeare plus a pile of letters, 
Hamlet does lurk. By shaking a tray of printer's type, one can get a 
few short words, which are destroyed as soon as they are composed. 
If sentences begin to appear (an analogue of the long, symbolically 
coded DNA molecules and the polypeptide chains) and form into a 
poem or a short story (an analogue of the organism), one can be quite 
sure there are some formative, even irreversible, constraints on the 
sorting and shaking that are catching the upthrusts and directionally 
organizing them. 
It hardly seems coherent to hold that nonbiological materials are 
randomly the more and more derandomized across long structural 
sequences and thus ordered up to life. That is quite as miraculous as 
walking on water. Something is introducing the order, and, further, 
something seems to be introducing layer by layer new possibilities 
of order, new information achieved, not just unfolding the latent 
order already there from the start in the setup. 
Some will reply that all actual events materialize in a global pos-
sibility space, and while the former become over time, the latter does 
not. The possibility space is always there. There is no such thing as 
the creation of possibilities that were not there. New doors may open 
but only into rooms that previously existed, albeit unoccupied and 
with no furniture. One does not need to get possibilities from no-
where because there are infinite possibilities everlastingly, or at least 
since the Big Bang. The proof of this lies in what has subsequently 
happened. 
But surely the possibility space of serious alternatives does enlarge 
and shrink. There are times of opportunity, in which taking one di-
rection opens up new possibilities and taking another shuts them 
out. Along the way, new possibility space for genetic engineering is 
brought into the picture, and this is linked with the appearance of 
new information, to which we next turn. 
(2) The Genesis of Information 
The story becomes memorable – able to employ a memory – only 
with genes (or comparable predecessor molecules). The story be- 
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comes cumulative and transmissible. The fertility possibilities are a 
hundred times recompounded. If the DNA in the human body were 
uncoiled and stretched out end to end, that slender thread would 
reach to the sun and back over half a dozen times.4 That conveys 
some idea of the astronomical amount of information soaked 
through the body. In nature, in the Newtonian view there were two 
metaphysical fundamentals: matter and energy. Einstein reduced 
these two to one: matter-energy. In matter in motion, there is conser-
vation of matter, also of energy; neither can be created or destroyed, 
although each can take diverse forms, and one can be transformed 
into the other. In the biological sciences, as we have emphasized, the 
novelty is that matter-energy is found in living things in diverse 
information states. The biologists still claim two metaphysical fun-
damentals: matter-energy and information. Norbert Wiener insists, 
"Information is information, not matter or energy" (1948, p. 155). 
In living things, concludes Manfred Eigen, this is "the key-word 
that represents the phenomenon of complexity: information. Our 
task is to find an algorithm, a natural law that leads to the origin of 
information. . . . Life is a dynamic state of matter organized by infor- 
mation" (1992, p. 12, p. 15). Bernd-Olaf Küppers agrees: "The prob- 
lem of the origin of life is clearly basically equivalent to the problem 
of the origin of biological information" (1990, p. 170). George C. Wil- 
liams is explicit: 
Evolutionary biologists have failed to realize that they work with 
two more or less incommensurable domains: that of information 
and that of matter. . . . Matter and information [are] two separate 
domains of existence, which have to be discussed separately in 
their own terms. The gene is a package of information, not an 
object. . . . Maintaining this distinction between the medium and 
the message is absolutely indispensable to clarity of thought 
about evolution. (in Brockman 1995, p. 43) 
John Maynard Smith says: "Heredity is about the transmission, 
not of matter or energy, but of information. . . . The concept of infor- 
mation is central both to genetics and evolution theory" (1995, p. 28). 
The most spectacular thing about planet Earth, says Dawkins, is this 
4 Estimated from data in Orten and Neuhaus (1982, pp. 8 and 154). 
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"information explosion," even more remarkable than a supernova 
among the stars (1995, p. 145). And, adds, Klaus Dose, 
More than 30 years of experimentation on the origin of life in the 
fields of chemical and molecular evolution have led to a better 
perception of the immensity of the problem of the origin of life 
on Earth rather than its solution. . . . We do not actually know 
where the genetic information of all living cells originates. (1988, 
p. 348) 
When sodium and chlorine are brought together under suitable 
circumstances, anywhere in the universe, the result will be salt. This 
capacity is inlaid into the atomic properties; the reaction occurs spon-
taneously. Energy inputs may be required for some of these results, 
but no information input is needed. When nitrogen, carbon, and hy-
drogen are brought together under suitable circumstances anywhere 
in the universe, with energy input, the spontaneous result may be 
amino acids, but it is not hemoglobin molecules or lemurs – not 
spontaneously. The essential characteristic of a biological molecule, 
contrasted with a merely physicochemical molecule, is that it con-
tains vital information. Its conformation is functional. With the typi-
cal protein, enzyme, lipid, or carbohydrate this is structural, keyed 
by the coding in DNA. The coding here is information about coping 
in the macroscopic world that the organism inhabits. The informa-
tion (in DNA) is interlocked with an information producer-processor 
(the organism) that can transcribe, incarnate, metabolize, and repro-
duce it. All such information once upon a time did not exist but came 
into place; this is the locus of creativity. 
Nevertheless, on Earth, there is this result during evolutionary 
history. The result involves significant achievements in cybernetic 
creativity, essentially incremental gains in information that have 
been conserved and elaborated over evolutionary history. The know- 
how, so to speak, to make salt is already in the sodium and chlorine, 
but the know-how to make hemoglobin molecules and lemurs is not 
secretly coded in the carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen. Life is a local 
countercurrent to entropy, an energetic fight uphill in a world that 
typically moves thermodynamically downhill (despite some negen- 
tropic eddies, and despite irreversible thermodynamics). Thermody-
namics need be nowhere violated, because there is a steady "down-
hill" flow of energy, as energy is irradiated onto Earth from the sun, 
and, eventually, reradiated into space. 
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But some of this energy comes to pump a long route uphill. This 
is something like an old-fashioned hydraulic ram, where the main 
downstream flow is used to pump a domestic water supply a hun-
dred yards uphill through a pipe to a farmhouse – except of course 
that the ram pump is deliberately engineered and the "life pump" 
spontaneously assembled itself as an open cybernetic system several 
thousand times more complex and several billion years long. Life is 
a river that runs uphill, and even if it nowhere runs uphill very 
steeply (if we look at its incremental assembly bit by bit), the river as 
a whole runs far uphill, and each living creature in the stream is 
quite highly ordered. Some forces are present, some force, some 
Force! that sucks order in superseding steps out of disorder. Organ-
isms must be constructed along a long negentropic pathway. This 
requires the continual introduction of information not previously 
present. 
The central dogma of molecular and evolutionary biology is that 
random variations are introduced into the replication of this infor-
mation, that rarely such variations prove beneficial in the sense that 
they improve performance with the result that more offspring are 
produced, and that such variations in result increase proportionately 
in the gene pool. The classical view emphasizes that such variations 
occur at random and without regard to the needs of the organisms. 
Contemporary genetics is increasingly inclined to interpret this pro-
cess as a kind of information search using random variations in prob-
lem solving and to see the search space as more constrained by the 
prior achievements of the organism; nevertheless the random ele-
ment remains prominent. Here is where possibilities lie and where 
actual novelties are generated out of such possibilities. 
John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry analyze "the major tran-
sitions in evolution" with the resulting complexity, asking "how and 
why this complexity has increased in the course of evolution." "Our 
thesis is that the increase has depended on a small number of major 
transitions in the way in which genetic information is transmitted 
between generations." Critical innovations have included the origin 
of the genetic code itself, the origin of eukaryotes from prokaryotes, 
meiotic sex, multicellular life, animal societies, and language, espe-
cially human language. But, contrary to de Duve, Eigen, Calvin, 
Kauffman, or Cech, they find "no reason to regard the unique tran-
sitions as the inevitable result of some general law"; to the contrary, 
these events might not have happened at all (1995, p. 3). So what 
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makes the critical difference in evolutionary history is increase in the 
information possibility space, which is not something inherent in the 
precursor materials, nor in the evolutionary system, nor something 
for which biology has an evident explanation, although these events, 
when they happen, are retrospectively interpretable in biological cat-
egories. The biological explanation is modestly incomplete, recogniz-
ing the importance of the genesis of new information channels. 
The philosophical, metaphysical, and theological challenge, left 
over after the current scientific accounts, is the query what is the 
most adequate account of the origin of these information channels 
and the genetic information thereby discovered. In the course of ev-
olutionary history, one would be disturbed to find matter or energy 
spontaneously created, but here is information floating in from no-
where. For the lack of better explanations, the usual turn here is 
simply to conclude that nature is self-organizing (autopoiesis), 
though, since no "self" is present, this is better termed spontane-
ously organizing. An autopoietic process can be just a name, like 
"soporific" tendencies, used to label the mysterious genesis of more 
out of less, a seemingly scientific name that is really a sort of mystic 
chant over a miraculously fertile universe. 
What is inadequately recognized in the "self-organizing" accounts 
is that, though no new matter or energy is needed for such sponta-
neous organization, new information is needed in enormous 
amounts and that one cannot just let this information float in from 
nowhere. Over evolutionary history, something is going on "over the 
heads" of any and all of the local, individual organisms. More comes 
from less, again and again. A more plausible explanation is that, 
complementing the self-organizing, there is a Ground of Information, 
or an Ambience of Information, otherwise known as God. 
(3) The Genesis of Value 
Another way of interpreting this genesis of information arises from 
looking at its result: the generation, transmission, and deepening of 
values. Scientists and philosophers have been much exercised about 
the generation of values, about how an ought comes out of an is, but 
it seems pretty much fact of the matter that, over evolutionary his-
tory, values have been generated, startling though this may also be. 
"Survival value" figures large in evolutionary theory. Something is 
always dying, and something is always living on. For all the struggle, 
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violence, and transition, there is abiding value. The question is not 
whether Earth is a well-designed paradise for all its inhabitants, nor 
whether it was a former paradise from which humans were anciently 
expelled. The question is whether it is a place of significant value 
achievement. 
Scientists have sometimes tried to portray nature as a valueless 
place, and that can seem so in the emptiness of outer space, or the 
frozen wastes of Antarctica, or the sands of the Sahara. But where 
there is life, value is always at stake. Once humans might have 
thought that even biological nature is valueless, with value lighting 
up as, and only as, humans take an interest in what is going on. But 
such anthropocentrism has become increasingly incredible in Dar-
win's century. The same evolutionary science that discovered nature 
red in tooth and claw discovered the value in teeth and claws, the 
vitality flowing in the blood, the world as a sphere of the contest of 
values, generated in this perpetual contest. These biological scientists 
and their evolutionary and ecological sciences are a witness to the 
genesis of values, in the biodiversity they describe and wish to pro-
tect, in the insights into human origins and possibilities they seek to 
gain, in the morality they urge, at the same time that their theory is 
incompetent to warrant, support, or appraise such values. 
Evaluating Earth, the appropriate category is not moral goodness, 
for there are no moral agents in nature; the appropriate category is 
some one or more kinds of nonmoral goodness, better called its value, 
its worth. One must evaluate phenomena such as the achievement of 
diversity and complexity out of simplicity; the discovery of sentience, 
cognition, experience; the mixture of order and contingency, of au-
tonomy and interdependence. This epic of vital ascent is the rare 
expression point, on Earth, of a peculiar power in cosmic nature. 
Something divine is embodied (incarnate) in the story. Any struggle 
and suffering can only be interpreted in the context of such creativ-
ity. 
According to a long dominant paradigm, there is no value without 
an experiencing valuer, just as there are no thoughts without a 
thinker, no percepts without a perceiver, no deeds without a doer, 
no targets without an aimer. Valuing is felt preferring by human 
choosers. Possibly, extending this paradigm, sentient animals may 
also value, using their teeth and claws, or maybe even plants can 
value as they, nonconsciously, defend their lives with thorns and 
propagate their kind with seeds. But, in an evolutionary account, the 
360 
Religion 
value story becomes systemic, more holistic, ecological, global. Earth 
is a value-generating system, value-genic, valuable, value-able, that 
is, able to generate values that are widely "distributed," "dispersed," 
"allocated," "proliferated," "divided," "multiplied," "transmitted," 
"recycled," and "shared" over the face of the Earth. 
It is true that humans are the only evaluators who can reflect 
about what is going on at this global scale, who can evaluate what 
has happened in natural and cultural history, who can deliberate 
about what they ought to do conserving these events. When humans 
do this, they must set up the scales, and humans are the measurers 
of things. Animals, organisms, species, ecosystems, Earth cannot 
teach us how to do this evaluating. But they can display what it is 
that is to be valued and evaluated. The axiological scales we con-
struct do not constitute the value, any more than the scientific scales 
we erect create what we thereby measure. 
Humans are not so much lighting up value in a merely potentially 
valuable world as they are psychologically joining ongoing planetary 
natural history in which there is value wherever there is positive 
creativity. Although such creativity can be present in subjects with 
their interests and preferences, it can also be present objectively in 
living organisms with their lives defended, and in species that de-
fend an identity over time, and in systems that are self-organizing 
and that project storied achievements. The valuing subject in an oth-
erwise valueless world is an insufficient premise for the experienced 
conclusions of those who value natural history. Conversion to an 
evolutionary and ecological view seems truer to world experience, 
more logically compelling, better informed. 
From this more objective viewpoint, there is something subjective, 
something philosophically naive, and even something hazardous in 
a time of ecological crisis, for humans to continue to live (as in an 
age of science they have often done) as though nature were valueless 
and everything previously generated in natural history were only to 
be evaluated relative to its potential to produce benefit for humans. 
When Earth's most complex product, Homo sapiens, becomes intelli-
gent enough to reflect over this earthy wonderland, everyone is left 
stuttering about the mixtures of accident and necessity out of which 
we have evolved. But nobody has much doubt that this is, recalling 
the way that the astronauts phrased it, "a small pearl in a thick sea 
of black mystery" (Mitchell), "to be treasured and nurtured, some-
thing precious that must endure" (Collins; Section 1[1]). Almost as if 
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to dispute Wilson's claim that nothing Earth-bound can be transcen-
dent, Mitchell adds, "My view of our planet was a glimpse of divin-
ity" (Kelley 1988, at photograph 52). 
Those axe astronauts, not biologists, but what they see is the home 
planet, the living planet in all its startling possibilities, of which ev-
olutionary history is the most indisputable evidence. We have earlier 
heard Edward Wilson celebrating that biodiversity, finding it in its 
own way "miraculous," and urging its conservation, even when he 
could find no such divinity. Here again is the fertility, which gener-
ates religion. Earth is dirt, all dirt, but we find revealed what dirt can 
do when it is self-organizing under suitable conditions with water 
and solar illumination. We will not be valuing Earth objectively until 
we appreciate this marvelous natural history. 
Life persists because it is provided for in the ecological Earth sys-
tem. Earth is a kind of providing ground, where the life epic is lived 
on in the midst of its perpetual perishing, life arriving and struggling 
through to something higher. One may think, as we near a conclu-
sion, that biology produces many doubts; here are two more: I doubt 
whether one can take biology seriously, the long epic of life on Earth, 
the prolific fecundity that surrounds us on this planet, without a 
respect for life, and the line between respect for life and reverence 
for life is one that I doubt that you can always recognize. If anything 
at all on Earth is sacred, it must be this enthralling generativity that 
characterizes our home planet. "The world is sacred." That is the 
conclusion of even so resolute a naturalist as Daniel Dennett, which 
not even Darwin's "universal acid" can dissolve, dissolve God 
though this acid can (1995, pp. 520-521). So the secular – this present, 
empirical epoch, this phenomenal world, studied by science – does 
not eliminate the sacred after all; to the contrary, the secular evolves 
into the sacred. If there is any holy ground, any land of promise, this 
promising Earth is it. 
But then why not say that here, if anywhere, is the brooding Spirit 
of God? One needs an adequate explanation for generating the sa-
cred out of the secular. Indeed, why not even go on to say that this 
genesis of value is the genesis of grace, since the root idea in "grace" 
(Latin: gratia) is pleasing, favorable, praiseworthy; essentially, again, 
the idea of something valuable, now also a given. In this genesis, 
nature is a sequence of gifts; we are given what has "sprung forth" 




and find that, in this springing forth, values are created. Whatever 
else has happened, there has been the genesis of values; each of us is 
a remarkable instance of that. 
"The essence of religion," said Harald Höffding, "consists in the 
conviction that value will be preserved" (1906, p. 14). That helps us 
to understand Mayr's remark that most biologists are religious. If 
one finds a world in which value is given and persists over time, one 
has a religious assignment. A central function of religion is the con-
servation of value, and value generated and conserved is the first 
fact of natural history, as well as the principal task of culture. Fred-
erick Ferré defines religion, "One's religion... is one's way of valu-
ing most intensively and most comprehensively" (1970, p. 11). At the 
metaphysical level, science neither describes nor evaluates the gene-
sis of value adequately, although the descriptions of biological sci-
ence  those of evolutionary history eventuating in cultural history – 
present an account that demands evaluating, intensively and com-
prehensively. Religion is about the finding, creating, saving, redeem-
ing of such persisting sacred value in the world. In this sense, what-
ever the quarrels between religion and biology, there is nothing 
ungodly about a world in which values persist in the midst of their 
perpetual perishing. That is as near as Earthlings can come to an 
ultimate concern; such benefit, such "blessing," is where, on Earth, 
the Ultimate might be incarnate. 
(4) Detecting the Transcendent 
The universe existed for ten or fifteen billion years without any bio-
logical information present, so far as we know. The divine presence 
in that epoch will need to be found in the setup, in the fine-tuned 
universe, or, along the way, in, with, and under the physics, astro-
physics, and chemistry. Such presence continues during the biologi-
cal epoch on Earth. But now the creativity is more notably that gen-
erating the information vital to life. Again, one can appeal to the 
set-up. In our corner of the universe, the interplay of matter and 
energy accumulated into a solar system with one lucky planet. Per-
haps there are other such planets; we do not know whether they are 
common or rare. But at least there is this one. 
Located at a felicitous distance from the sun, Earth has liquid wa-
ter; atmosphere; a suitable mix of elements, compounds, minerals; 
and an ample supply of energy. Radioactivity deep within the Earth 
363 
Genes, Genesis and God 
produces enough heat to keep its crust constantly mobile in counter-
action with erosional forces, and the interplay of such forces gen-
erates and regenerates landscapes and seas – mountains, canyons, 
rivers, plains, islands, volcanoes, estuaries, continental shelves. Geo-
chemistry is as relevant as chemistry. The properties of the elements 
– hydrogen, carbon, and so on – are necessary but not sufficient. The 
properties of the Earth system, a kind of cooking pot, are also neces-
sary, and, together with the physicochemical properties, perhaps 
these are sufficient to make life probable, even inevitable. 
Detecting the transcendent asks whether God underlies that setup. 
God lies in, with, and under the forces that created Earth as the home 
(the ecosystem) that could produce all those myriads of kinds. God, 
the Ground of the Universe, is also the Good Fortune of the Planet. 
"Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their kinds'' 
(Genesis 1.24). The Earth-system does prove to be prolife; the story 
goes from zero to five million species in five billion years, passing 
through perhaps five billion species that have come and gone en 
route. The setup, first on cosmological levels and later on planetary 
levels, mixes chance and order in creative ways. If, once, there was a 
primitive planetary environment in which the formation of living 
things had a high probability, for such living things to become actual 
would require not so much interference by a supernatural agency as 
the recognition of a marvelous endowment of matter with a propen-
sity toward life. So the molecular biologists were earlier arguing. 
Such a natural performance could be congenially seen, at a deeper 
level, as the divine creativity. 
But one still has to give an account of the information appearing 
ex nihilo, that is, where no such information was present before. One 
may indeed need a fortunate endowment of matter with a life pro-
pensity (helped perhaps by the anthropic principle in astrophysics) 
and at the same time still need something to superintend the possi-
bilities during evolutionary history. That there are complementary 
explanations does not always mean that one is superfluous. Here one 
can posit God as a countercurrent to entropy, a sort of biogravity 
that lures life upward. God would not do anything in particular but 
be the background, autopoietic force energizing all the particulars. 
The particulars would be the discoveries of the autonomous individ-
uals. God would be the lift-up (more than the setup) that elevates the 
creatures along their paths of cybernetic and storied achievement. 
God introduces new possibility spaces all along the way. What the- 
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ologians once termed an established order of creation is rather an 
order that dynamically creates, an order for creating. 
One should posit, says Daniel Dennett, "cranes," not "skyhooks," 
for the building up of evolutionary history (1995, pp. 73-80). That 
contrast of metaphor seems initially persuasive, appealing to causes 
more natural than supernatural, more immanent than transcendent. 
When we pinpoint the issue, however – what account to give of this 
remarkable negentropic, cybernetic self-organizing that characterizes 
the life story on Earth – the metaphor becomes more pejoratively 
rhetorical than analytically penetrating. There is the repeated discov-
ery of information how to redirect the downhill flow of energy up-
ward for the construction of ever more advanced, higher forms of 
life, built on and supported by the lower forms. Up and down are 
rather local conditions (down, up a few miles); it does not matter 
much which direction we imagine this help as coming from – east or 
west, from the right or left, from below or above, high or deep, im-
manence or transcendence, skyhooks or cranes. The Hebrew meta-
phor was that one needs "wind" as well as "dirt." The current meta-
phor is that one needs "information" as well as "matter" and 
"energy." 
Stripped of the rhetoric, what the "skyhook" metaphor means, 
Dennett says, is explanations that are more "mindlike," and the 
"cranes" metaphor posits "mindless, motiveless mechanicity." Den-
nett holds that Darwinian science, extrapolated philosophically, has 
discovered cranes upon cranes "all the way down" and building up 
and up with "creative genius." "There is simply no denying the 
breathtaking brilliance of the designs to be found in nature" (1995, 
pp. 76, 155, and 74). But if the secret of such creativity is information 
possibilities opening up and information searched and gained, then 
the kind of explanation needed can as plausibly be said to be 
mind-like as mindless mechanicity. 
One might look to the potential deep in matter, "cranes all the 
way down." There is a kind of bottomless bootstrapping, as if lifting 
oneself up and up by one's own bootstraps were not remarkable, 
matter lofting itself up into mind. Such cranes, piling up higher and 
higher, are still pretty "super," quite imposing with their endless 
superimposing of one achievement on another. One can just as well 
look to some destiny toward which such matter is animated and 
inspired (skyhooks). Even after an infinite regress of cranes, or a 
regress ending in nothing at all, or in informationless matter- 
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energy, or in a big bang, one might not find that explanations are 
over. The issue is where the information comes from by which matter 
and energy become so superimposingly informed across evolution-
ary history that this brilliant, "sacred" (Dennett) output arises from 
a beginning in mindless chaos; how "out of next to nothing the 
world we know and love created itself" (p. 185). 
In this "world of propensities," concludes Karl Popper, the "in-
herently creative" process with its "staggering" biodiversity is nei-
ther mechanistic nor deterministic. "This was a process in which 
both accidents and preferences, preferences of the organisms for certain 
possibilities, were mixed: the organisms were in search of a better 
world. Here the preferred possibilities were, indeed, allurements" 
(1990, pp. 26 and 20). Cranes or skyhooks, evolutionary development 
is "attracted to" (in the current "chaos" metaphor) cumulating 
achievements in both diversity and complexity, and this attraction 
needs explanation. Attractors, or, at a more metaphysical level, even 
an Attractor, seem quite rational explanations.6 
Returning to the metaphor of the alphabet and Shakespeare, the 
question is whether, in the introduction of these possibilities, one 
needs an author as well as an alphabet. What is required to get Ham-
let is a great deal of information input into the letters. Perhaps the 
alphabet-author analogy is flawed. That analogy places all the crea-
tivity in the author working with an inert alphabet. One needs rather 
to posit a self-organizing alphabet, and a maker to start up and sus-
tain such a self-organizing alphabet. Still, the elemental materials are 
not evidently an alphabet from the beginning; they have to be taken 
over for alphabetic functions. Some story has to be generated with 
these materials-become-alphabet. That requires information input 
"To me the most fascinating property of the process of evolution is its uncanny 
capacity to mirror some properties of the human mind (the intelligent Artificer) 
while being bereft of others" (Dennett 1987, p. 299). It seems important to Den-
nett that the design is a mirage. Or, more accurately, the design isn't a mirage, 
for there is a designing system, but that there is a Designer of the designing 
system is a mirage. One needs no supernature, and the evidence for this is that 
we can plunge into subnature, and subsubnature, and subsubsubnature, simpli-
fying all the way down until there is nothing at all. Although creativity is forbid-
den from above, it is welcomed from below. But set aside the above-below im-
agery, still the "attraction" to something out of chaos, the "genesis" of something 
out of nothing, of more out of less – such brute fact remains as evident as ever, 




into such alphabetic materials, or, if not "input," information gener-
ation in some way or other. The skeptic will protest that there is no 
need for an author at all. One can have law without lawgivers, his-
tory without historians, creativity without creators, information 
without an informer, and stories without storytellers. 
Change the analogy: the elements are more like "seeds'' than "let-
ters." The root meaning of "nature" is "generating," and nature has 
all these possibilities "seeded" into it. The problem with such a 
model is that we now know what is in seeds as the secret of their 
possibilities – information – and there is no such information inside 
amino acids, much less hydrogen and carbon atoms, much less elec-
trons and protons. The creation of matter, energy, law, history, sto-
ries, of all the information that generates nature, to say nothing of 
culture, does need an adequate explanation: some sources, source, or 
Source competent for such creativity. Seeds need a source. In the 
materializing of the quantum states, bubbling up from below; in the 
compositions of prebiotic molecules; in the genetic mutations, there 
are selective principles at work, as well as stabilities and regularities, 
forming and in-forming these materials, which principles order and 
order up the story. 
This portrays a loose teleology, a soft concept of creation, one that 
permits genuine, though not ultimate, integrity and autonomy in the 
creatures. We have in the life adventure an interaction phenomenon, 
where a prolife principle is overseeing the affairs of matter. The di-
vine spirit is the giver of life, pervasively present over the millennia. 
God is the atmosphere of possibilities, the metaphysical environment 
in, with, and under first the natural and later also the cultural envi-
ronment, luring the Earthen histories upslope. God orchestrates such 
self-organizing, steadily elevating the possibilities, making for sto-
ried achievements, enriching the values generated. 
God could sometimes also be in the details. The general picture is 
not one of divine micromanagement; rather of secular integrity and 
creaturely self-organizing. The extent to which divine inspiration en-
ters into particulars might be difficult to know, especially if God 
operated with the resolve to maximize the creaturely autonomy, to 
prompt rather than to command. Dennett concedes, for example, that 
no Martian biologists, examining "a laying hen, a Pekingese dog, a 
barn swallow, and a cheetah," could prove, simply from an exami-
nation of the organisms, that the former were the product of delib-
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and the latter were the product of natural selection only. "If the 
engineers chose to conceal their interventions as best they could. . . 
there may be no foolproof marks of natural (as opposed to artificial) 
selection" (1987, pp. 284r-285). 
If there has been divine selection, this will not be detectable as any 
gap in or perforation of the natural order; it might be detectable in 
the resulting genesis, or creativity. If the roulette wheels at Las Vegas 
spin at random most of the time, but once a year God loaded the 
dice, that would be difficult to detect. Chance is an effective mask for 
the divine action. Still, God could be slipping information into the 
world. One might suspect such divine presence if the resulting story, 
in the lotteries of natural history, produced the epic adventures that 
have in fact actually managed to happen. An "information explo-
sion" on our Earth, rare in the universe, might be a clue that "inspi- 
ration" is taking place. 
Perhaps it is a mistake to look for God in the particulars of infor-
mation discovery. God does not intervene as a causal force in the 
world, not at least of such kind as science can detect. "God" is 
not among the entries to be found in the index of a biology text. 
God perennially underlies the causal forces in the world, and God 
gives meaning to the world, which science is incompetent to evalu-
ate. That does require the introduction of channels for information, 
and information in those channels, which arrives in the particulars 
of genetic trial and error. Such information is not a mere cause, not 
in any physicochemical sense, but a novel "cause" that puts mean-
ings into events, that generates all the richness of evolutionary his-
tory. 
God is an explanatory dimension7 for which contemporary biol-
ogy leaves ample space, as we have seen as biologists stutter over 
the origins of the information that generates complexity and diver-
sity, over any selection for progress, over what to make of random-
ness, over the introduction of possibilities. If one adds the desire of a 
Creator not so much to conceal such complementing selective activ-
ity as to optimize the integrity, autonomy, and self-creativity of the 
creatures – letting them do their thing, generating and testing, dis-
carding what does not work and keeping what does – with divine 
coaching on occasion, then a conclusion that there is a divine pres-
ence underneath natural history becomes as plausible as that there is 
7 A cause in the Aristotelian, though not the scientific sense. 
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not. The question becomes not so much a matter of conclusive proof 
as of warranted faith. 
There once was a causal chain that led to vertebrae in animals, 
where there were none before, an incremental chain no doubt, but 
still a chain by which the novelty of the vertebral column was intro-
duced on Earth. Such a chain is constructed with the emergence of 
more and more information; this information, coded in DNA, in-
forms the matter and energy so as to build the vertebral cord. The 
cord is constructed because it has a value (a significance, here a pre-
cursor of meaning) to the organism. It makes possible the diverse 
species of life that the vertebrate animals defend. Continuing the 
development of the endoskeleton, it makes possible larger animals 
with mobility, flexibility, integrated neural control. When such con-
struction of valuable biodiversity has gone on for millennia, the epic 
suggests mysterious powers that signal the divine presence. 
The question, the biologists will say, is of the selective forces. Yes, 
but the answer comes, partly at least, from seeing the results, with 
ever more emerging from what is earlier less and less. One seeking 
to detect the divine inspiration will notice how there are occasions – 
seasons, contexts, events, episodes, whatever they are called – during 
which critical information emerges in the world, breakthroughs, as it 
were, incremental and cumulative though these can also be. This will 
be true in culture, perhaps the inspiration that underlies the Ten 
Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount. It can as well be true 
in nature, in some inspiration that first animates matter and energy 
into life; or launches replication and genetic coding, or eukaryotes, 
or multicellular life, or sexuality; or energizes life with mitochondria 
and chloroplasts, or glycolysis and the citric acid cycle; or moves life 
onto land; or invents animal societies or acquired learning; or en-
dows life with mind; and inspires culture, ethics, religion, science. 
The skeptic's reply is always to emphasize that evolution is not 
elegant. It is wasteful, blundering, struggling. Evolution works with 
what is at hand and makes something new out of it. The creatures 
stumble around, and if there is a God who "intervenes," God ought 
to do better than that. There is only a "blind watchmaker" (Dawkins 
1986). Still, consider again the remarkable results, and the providence 
appropriate to a God who celebrates an Earth history, who inspires 
self-creativity. The word "design" nowhere occurs in Genesis,8 
8 The word "design" also seldom occurs in this book, by design. 
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though the concept of creativity pervades the opening chapters. 
There is divine fiat, divine doing, but the mode is an empowering 
permission that places productive autonomy in the creation. It is not 
that there is no "watchmaker"; there is no "watch." Looking for one 
frames the problem the wrong way. There are species well adapted 
for problem solving, ever more informed in their self-actualizing. The 
watchmaker metaphor seems blind to the problem that here needs to 
be solved: that informationless matter-energy is a splendid informa-
tion maker. Biologists cannot deny this creativity; indeed, better than 
anyone else biologists know that Earth has brought forth the natural 
kinds, prolifically, exuberantly over the millennia, and that enor-
mous amounts of information are required to do this. 
The achievements of evolution do not have to be optimal to be 
valuable, and if a reason that they are not optimal is that they had to 
be reached historically along story lines, then we rejoice in this richer 
creativity. History plus value as storied achievement in creatures 
with their own integrity is better than optimum value without his-
tory, autonomy, or adventure in superbly designed marionettes. That 
is beauty and elegance of a more sophisticated form, as in the fauna 
and flora of an ancient forest. The elegance of the thirty-two crystal 
classes is not to be confused with the grace of life renewed in the 
midst of its perpetual perishing, generating diversity and complexity, 
repeatedly struggling through to something higher, a response to the 
brooding winds of the Spirit moving over the face of these 
Earthen waters. 
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